Series: AWM95
Australian Army commanders' diaries
[Vietnam]

Headquarters units

Item number: 1/4/7

Item: Headquarters, 1 Australian Task Force

Duty Officer's log

[1-31 Aug 1966]
AMMUNITION MANAGEMENT

1. Responsibilities for the management of ammunition within 1 ATF are set out below.

a. Policy. G Branch at HQ 1 ATF and within units are responsible for determining general policy, quantities to be held and forecasting requirements.

b. Provisioning. Based upon G Branch unit/HQ 1 ATF forecasts, Q Branch HQ 1 ATF is responsible for arranging with 1 ALSG the delivery of ammunition to delivery points, TFMA (when established) or gun lines.

c. Demands. Until such time as the TFMA is able to hold stocks on the ground unit demands should normally reach ST Representative HQ 1 ATF by 1500 hours two days prior to day that delivery is required as no ammunition is held at 1 ALSG and time is required for effecting detail inspection, issue from US Ord Depot VUNG TAU, loading and delivery by daily road convoy to the NUI DAT area. In a tactical emergency and for unforecasted operations deliveries may be effected at shorter notice in these events demands should arrive at HQ 1 ATF not later than 1500 hours prior to day of delivery.

d. Stockstales and Usage Rates. Units are to maintain records of stock levels to be maintained, actual holding, and should endeavour to establish usage rates as a basis for planning. It is a command responsibility to ensure that adequate stocks including reserves are held to support operations.

e. Storage, Maintenance and Inspection. Storage, Maintenance and Inspection of second line holdings is a Q Branch responsibility. Within units storage, maintenance and inspection is a GS responsibility. An Ammunition Technician is attached to det 21 Sup Pl within the 1 ATF TFMA. He is to conduct periodical inspections of unit ammunition holdings and report on their condition and storage as directed by Q Branch HQ 1 ATF. Units may request advice of the technician through HQ ARU/TFMA. An instruction on Unit Storage of Ammo in the Field is attached at Annex A.

f. Malfunctions. Reporting of malfunctions is a G Branch responsibility. Malfunctions are to be reported immediately through the TOC Duty Officer and confirmed in writing through G Branch. An instruction on the reporting of malfunctions is attached at Annex B.

g. Suspensions. Proclamation of ammunition suspensions is a G Branch function. Immediately upon receipt of advice of a suspension units are to examine stocks held and segregate suspended lots. In order to facilitate such action lots where ever possible should be kept segregated and identified from time of receipt. G Branch HQ 1 ATF is to be advised of quantities of suspended items held and any effect it has on current operations. Demands for replacement if required are to be in accordance with para 1c. above.
h. Containers. Not less than 25% of containers for ammunition held should be retained for the backloading of suspended ammunition should the need arise.

i. Backloading. Backloading of suspended ammunition is to be requested of Q Branch HQ I ATTF by units.

j. Ammunition in Short Supply. Certain ammunitions are in theatre/world-wide short supply. For these UKANV issue ASRs (Available Supply Rates). ASRs cannot be exceeded without seeking approval through HQ II Field Force Vietnam. Proclamation and seeking the raising of ASRs is a Q Branch responsibility. As soon as the need to obtain the raising of ASRs is anticipated the following should be advised:

(1) DODAC number.

(2) Type of ammunition.

(3) Quantities requested above ASR per weapon per day.

(4) Number of weapons requested for.

(5) Approximate number of days involved and the reason, e.g. "required for support of Operation BLANK".

Other ammunition may be in local short supply at VUNG TAU from time to time. Forecast of requirements should be made therefore so that the required ammunition may be procured from elsewhere within the theatre.

Annexes: A. Unit Storage of Ammunition in the Field.
B. Malfunction Reports Ammunition and Explosives.

Distribution:

Distribution List A.

\textit{Internal}:

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Asst S3
S4
Asst S4
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UNIT STORAGE OF AMMUNITION IN THE FIELD

GENERAL

1. Correct storage of ammunition in SOUTH VIETNAM must be regarded of prime importance by all units. Incorrect storage results in unacceptable hazards to personnel living in the vicinity of ammo storage areas and particularly in this tropical environment, it also causes malfunctions which may be disastrous whilst on operations.

STORAGE IN THE TROPICS

2. As found in SOUTH VIETNAM, the rain followed by intense sunlight combine to produce conditions of heat and humidity, which greatly accelerate the deterioration of ammunition and packing materials. Fungi may attack the cloth components, such as propelling charge bags, fabric machine gun belts, and bandoliers and ropes. Termites can eat through dunnage, ammo boxes and fibre containers. Rain and direct sunlight can affect the explosives themselves. The importance of the following requirements can NOT be over emphasised:

   a. Adequate dunnage must be found for ammo storage. Ammo must NOT be stored on the ground.

   b. Ammo must be protected from both direct sunlight and rain.

   c. Adequate ventilation must be provided to prevent "sweating".

   d. Always store ammo in the containers provided unless required for immediate use.

   e. Ensure that the ammo is stored in such a manner and location that accidental initiation of the ammo or initiation by enemy action will not result in casualties to friendly troops.

PROTECTION AGAINST THE WEATHER


   a. Dunnage is to be provided so that the ammo is at least three inches off the ground. As ammo is generally received palletised, these provide an ideal basis for storage where dunnage is not available. Local timber can also be used for this purpose.

   b. The ideal size for each stack is 9 feet x 9 feet x 5 feet high; for ease of covering, speed of issue and ventilation.

   c. If drainage is poor, ditches should be dug around the stacks.

4. Covered accommodation. Ammunition should always be stored out of the direct rays of the sun and protected from rain.

   a. The priority for the allocation of covered accommodation is:

      (1) EL Cartridges, og 155mm Propelling charges.

      (2) Pyrotechnics including smoke grenades, trip flares.

2/ (3)
(3) Rocket motors including 84mm and 3.5 Rockets.
(4) Demolition Explosives and ancillary stores.
(5) Mortar Ammunition.
(6) QF Separate Ammunition and 105mm Carts.
(7) QF Fixed Ammunition eg 106mm.
(8) Grenades HE.
(9) Boxed Shell.
(10) Small Arms Ammo.
(11) HE Shell eg 155mm.

b. Where tarps are used, adequate provision is to be made for ventilation. The top of the tarpaulin should not rest on the top of the stack or in contact with boxes, but should be raised from the top of the stack at least six inches. Protective sides should be used, unless the roof overlaps sufficiently to prevent driving rain and direct sunlight.

c. Underground storage may be used, however care must be exercised to ensure that ventilation is good. Poor ventilation will result in sweating which often leads to misfires and malfunctions.

STORAGE

5. Ammunition should, wherever tactically possible, be stored in such a location and such a manner that should an explosion occur, the entire area dump is not destroyed and that the lives of friendly troops are not endangered. The following general storage instructions should be observed:

a. Outside Safety Distance.

(1) Minimum outside safety distances between Ammo storage locations and key military installations such as FCA depots is 600 yds.

(2) To avoid being involved in any aircraft accident it should not be stacked even temporarily within 200 yds of a runway or LZ.

(3) Civilian and military hospitals should not be within 1200 yards.

(4) No consideration has been given to lethal range of fragments in determining these distances with the exception that hospitals will normally be outside the range of fragments.

b. Inside Safety Distances. Although it may not be possible to comply fully with Ammunition and Explosives Regulations on a unit level in the Unit Areas, for calculating distances between stacks and compatibility, the following precautions must be observed.

(1) Rockets and rocket motors if ignited tend to fly end scatter. They should be protected by traverses of sandbags or earth or by natural features. This applies to Carl Gustaff Ammo, 3.5 Rockets and 50mm LAW when held.

(2) Ball detonators are to be stored on their own in isolated locations.
(3) Ammunition filled with white phosphorus is to be isolated from other ammunition in an area adjacent to a readily available supply of water. If water is not available buckets or other containers will be kept filled with water at each location. A special first aid kit for treatment of white phosphorus burns will also be provided at each location. (i.e. 4% Copper Sulphate/Soft Soap solution in wide mouth jars).

6. Each ammunition stock should be sandbagged as soon as possible. This protects the ammo from enemy attack and also protects the troops and stores located near the ammo dumps.

SAFETY PRECAUTIONS

7. Fire protection. Adequate firefighting equipment must be provided to prevent a minor fire from igniting the ammo.

8. Always handle ammunition and explosives carefully.

9. Remove dirt, grit and foreign materials from containers and ammo before placing in storage.

10. Do not store ammo and explosives in a loose condition or in badly damaged containers.

11. Keep all containers closed to avoid ingress of moisture and to protect ammo during handling.

12. Store each lot of ammo separately to keep lot identity. This will ensure segregation of unusable ammo if any lots are restricted or suspended.

13. Make sure stacks are stable.

14. Do NOT open, repair or repack containers in or within 100 feet of an ammo stack except for immediate use.

15. Do not smoke or use naked lights within 100 feet of an ammo stack.

16. Ensure that no unauthorised personnel go in or near the ammo storage location. Sabotage of ammo is easily accomplished with very effective results.

CONCLUSION

17. Handled and stored correctly, ammunition waste will be reduced and ammo reliability increased. The same care must be exercised with ammo as is expected in the care of weapons.
MALFUNCTION REPORTS AMMUNITION AND EXPLOSIVES

1. Whilst units are located in SOUTH VIETNAM Malfunction Reports for Ammunition and Explosives are to be submitted in accordance with USARV Regulation 75-1 attached.

2. In addition a copy of the Malfunction Report is to be submitted to DADOS c/- I ALSG.

3. Units are to ensure that the procedure listed in para 4 b. is strictly adhered to. The verbal report must be transmitted by the fastest possible means to addressees shown in the Regulation and also to DADOS. This is to ensure that other units using the item can be informed of any restriction or suspension that may be required.
EXPOSIVES

Malfunction Reports Ammunition and Explosives
(ROC AMC 132)

1. PURPOSE: To prescribe policy and procedures for timely and accurate reporting of preliminary and final reports of ammunition and explosives malfunction.

2. SCOPE: This regulation is applicable to all elements of United States Army Vietnam.

3. RESPONSIBILITIES:

a. Adjutant General, G4, this headquarters is responsible for overall implementation and monitoring the provisions and procedures of this regulation and directly responsible for action as outlined in paragraph 5 below.

b. The Commanding General, 1st Logistic Command is directly responsible, by delegation of authority, for implementation of provisions of this regulation in accordance with paragraph 4d below.

c. The commanding officer of each ammunition battalion is directly responsible, by delegation of authority, for furnishing technical assistance to using units for investigation and processing of malfunction reports.

d. Using units are directly responsible for compliance with pertinent portions of this regulation.

4. PROCEDURES:

a. When ammunition is drawn, transported, stored and during firing, every effort will be made to maintain lot identity in case there is an accident or malfunction of the ammunition.

b. A unit experiencing a malfunction of ammunition or explosives will, by the most expeditious means (courier, mail, telephone, teletype, or radio net), submit a preliminary verbal report followed immediately by a written report, directly to the 1st Logistic Command, ATTN: Ammunition Directorate. A verbal report and information copies of the written report will be submitted to the commanding officer of the nearest ammunition supply point and the commander of the nearest major tactical command. The information listed at Inclosure 1 will be included in the report.

c. The commanding officer of the ammunition supply point receiving preliminary notification of malfunction will coordinate the information with the nearest ammunition battalion commander who will despatch a technical representative to the involved unit to assist in the investigation of the incident and preparation of the final report. The final report will follow the preliminary report within 30 days in accordance with paragraph, 7, 700-1300-8.

d. The Commanding General, 1st Logistic Command will implement the operation requirements for notification of suspensions and preliminary malfunction reports to AFGA, USARV, COMUSMACV, CINCPAC, 2d Log Command, 5th Special Forces Group, III MAF/NCG, 2d Air Division, and all logistic subordinate units.

5. Upon notification by Commanding General, 1st Logistic
Command of suspension of ammunition or explosives due to malfunctions, this headquarters (8-4 Section) will notify all major USARY tactical units.

6. REFERENCES:
   a. AR 700-1300-8.
   b. Msg UNCLASSIFIED CINCUSARPAC GPLO-SM 961
      D2G 140218Z Jan 66
      (AVD-AM)

FOR THE COMMANDER:

RICHARD J. SEITZ
Brigadier General, US Army
Chief of Staff

R.W. HORNBUCKLE
Lt Colonel, AGC
Acting Adjutant

1 Incl
Ammunition Malfunction Reporting (RCS AMC 132)

DISTRIBUTION:
A Plus
5 CINCUSARPAC
1 USARPAC H  Unit

7. Ensure adequate and complete information is received when units render a verbal preliminary report, request this report include the following 1AW para 5, AR 700-1300-8.
   a. Report number.
   b. Identification of unit (battery, company, division etc.)
   c. Calibre or missile code name, type, model, serial number, and manufacturer of gun tube and breech ring or launcher.
   d. Ammunition type, mark, or model number, lot number manufacturer, and complete Federal Stock Number, and DOD Ammunition Code.
   e. Components (model, manufacturer and lot number)
      (1) Fuze.
      (2) Propellant.
      (3) Separately issued components used in assembly of complete rounds, including rocket motors, fuzes propellants etc, with complete Federal Stock Number and/or serial number.
      (4) Others as required.
   f. Type of malfunction (weapon)
   g. Type of malfunction (ammunition)
   h. Number and types of injuries to personnel.

/ i. Estimated
i. Estimated amount of property damage.

j. Corrective action taken such as withdrawal of ammunition for use.

k. Total number of rounds of suspect lot fired and remaining quantity on hand.

l. Storage conditions.

m. Date, time, ambient weather conditions (temperature, rain, fog, etc.) when malfunction occurred.

n. Location of malfunction in relation to weapon or launcher and personnel involved.

o. Radio frequency energy source(s), density, and other description.

p. Details of hazard.

q. Statement as to existing political or international implication.

r. Whether fragments or components of interest to malfunction investigation are available.

s. Other information considered pertinent. (Preliminary report will not be delayed because of failure to establish all facts desired above.)
AMMUNITION

REFERENCE HQ I ATF "AMMUNITION MANAGEMENT DATED 3 AUG 66"

1. The following points were made at an ammunition conference held at HQ II P Force V recently.

(a) 81MM Mortar HE. Ammunition is malfunctioning in some instances due to wet igniters. Caps must be left on containers to prevent accumulation of water, which damages the igniters.

(b) Malfunction Reporting. It is imperative that the preliminary report of a malfunction be submitted to HQ 1st Log Comd, Attn: AVLC-6A-A with minimum delay.

(c) ARVN. Unexpected ammunition drawn by units for an operation will not be turned over to ARVN for expenditure without express authorization by HQ USARV.

(d) Artillery. Five per cent of selected artillery ammunition will be issued unerated in order to accumulate packaging materials for use by the Depots and ASP's in their renovation programs.

(e) Illuminating Munitions. Illuminating munitions are in short supply and will continue in this status for some time to come.

(f) Maintenance. Recent inspections revealed that basic load ammunition is not being adequately maintained.

(g) Rotation. Units are urged to rotate basic loads as often as possible. Some ammunition had been returned which was beyond the stage of rehabilitation.

(h) ASR. The need not to exceed ASR unless required to do so for operational urgent reasons was emphasized. Maximum lead time for the obtaining of the release authority and the locating of stocks to meet the extra expenditure is required.

2. Units are referred to the reference on Ammunition Management for guidance.

Maj
DAA and QMG
HQ IATF
HQ 1ATF
7 Aug 1966

1 ATF POLICY FOR ADMINISTRATION OF ATTACHED RVNAF PERSONNEL

Command and Control

1. During the period of attachment to 1ATF, RVNAF personnel are under command of 1ATF for operational matters. Control and allocation is the responsibility of the OC FW/Linguist Section in conjunction with the RVNAF Liaison Officer.

2. All administrative matters such as pay, leave, etc., and including applications for transfers will be the responsibility of the RVNAF Liaison Officer, in conjunction with the OC FW/Linguist Section.

3. No leave or re-assignment is to be granted without the approval of the RVNAF Liaison Officer or, in his absence, the OC FW/Linguist Section.

4. Attached RVNAF personnel are to be accorded the same courtesies and use of facilities as personnel of equal rank in the units with which they serve.

5. Pay
   a. RVNAF personnel will be paid in piastres once a month by the RVNAF Liaison Officer who will visit units on dates to be advised. RVNAF personnel are forbidden to possess or use Military Payment Certificates (MPC) or any US or Australian dollar instruments.
   b. During any absence of the RVNAF Liaison Officer over a pay period, units will be notified of temporary pay arrangements.

6. Mail
   a. The address for incoming mail is:
      Serial number, rank, name
      Unit
      1 Australian Task Force
      C/O PHUC TUY Sector HQ
      BARIA
      PHUC TUY Province
   b. Outgoing mail is to be delivered to the FW/Linguist Section for deposit at the post office, BARIA. Stamps may be obtained from the FW/Linguist Section.

7. Leave. The annual entitlement for leave is fifteen days inclusive of public holidays. This leave may be taken in two sections of seven and eight days. All applications for such leave are to be in writing addressed to the Liaison Officer, or, in his absence, to the OC FW/Linguist Section. Units are to append recommendation or non-recommendation. This does not affect any standdown of up to three days accorded by the unit but such standdown must be reported to the Liaison Officer. In his absence, the OC FW/Linguist Section.

8. Equipment and Clothing. Units to which the attached RVNAF personnel are allocated are responsible to provide a complete issue, at the existing Australian scale, of Australian clothing and equipment. Such clothing and equipment is to be withdrawn on permanent cessation of attachment to 1ATF. Bedding and tentage is to be provided by the unit in accordance with the current scale.

9. Rationing. RVNAF attached personnel are to be entered on unit roll books as attached personnel and rationed for on the normal Australian scale.
10. Medical. Normal unit medical care is to be provided as well as transportation to RVNAF medical facilities when evacuation is required.

11. Discipline. Matters of discipline are to be referred to the RVNAF Liaison Officer and the C3 PW/Linguist Section.
AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES
HEADQUARTERS 1ST AUSTRALIAN TASK FORCE
NUI DAT

R459-1-1                      Aug 66

SUBJECT: Interrogation Capability - 1 ATF

TO: Commanding General
II Field Force Vietnam
APO San Francisco 96266

1. The current organisation (T O & E) of the 1st Australian Task Force (1 ATF) Linguist/PW Section provides one trained person, the Section Commander. He also is the only person within 1 ATF with interrogation experience.

2. Attached to the 1 ATF Linguist/PW Section are eight interpreters, none of whom have interrogation training. To assist in the interrogation effort, two US interrogators have been loaned for a period of one month commencing 18 July 66.

3. The two US interrogators are now heading two teams each consisting of one US interrogator, one Australian interpreter under training, and one ARVN interpreter. These teams have been quite successful, but the limitations imposed by the lack of trained interrogators has caused delays in processing detainees and consequently in extracting tactical intelligence. Sometimes, up to thirty suspects are brought in at the one time.

4. It is understood that a major build up of US interrogator personnel in-country, is in progress. In order to supplement the extremely limited capability of 1 ATF for tactical interrogation, it is requested that II FForce V detach five US interrogators to 1 ATF. It would be desirable if one of the five could be a senior NCO.

FOR THE COMMANDER

[Signature]

Roe
Maj
S1/S5
LIST D.

IATF ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTION NO. 1
BARBER FACILITIES HOA LONG

General

1. Barber shop facilities are now available in HOA LONG. Facilities exist for 10 persons only at any one time. The address is:
   COMMANDO COY COMPOUND, HOA LONG.

Timing and Allocation

2. Timing and Unit Allocation as follows:- Units are reminded that by mutual agreement these times/dates may be changed.

   SUN 0800H - 1200H - 1APC Sqn
   MON 1300H - 1630H - HQ 1ATF Incl HQ Coy 1ATF
       HQ 1ATF LAD
       7 Topo Svy
       Det 1 Div Int
   MON 0800H - 1200H - 5 RAR
       1300H - 1630H - 103 Sig Sqn
   TUE 0800H - 1200H - 6 RAR
       1300H - 1630H - 3 SAS
   WED 0800H - 1200H - 1 Fd Regt Incl Det 131 Div Inf Bty
       1300H - 1630H - 5 RAR
   THU 0800H - 1200H - 1 Fd Sqn
       1300H - 1630H - 6 RAR
   FRI 0800H - 1200H - 1 Fd Sqn
       1300H - 1630H - 5 RAR
   SAT 0800H - 1200H - 1APC Sqn
       1300H - 1630H - 6 RAR

Discipline

3. An NCO is to accompany each party of ten and is responsible for the conduct of troops he is with. All troops are to remain within the compound and are to proceed direct from Unit to Compound - Compound to Unit.

Dress

4. Units are reminded of the necessity of maintaining a high standard of dress and bearing.

[Signature]

Maj
DDA&OMG
PAYMENT OF LINGUISTS AT
1 AUSTRALIAN TASK FORCE COMBINED LANGUAGE COURSE

Reference: INT/12/66 of 12 Jun 66.

AIM

The aim of this paper is to recommend a satisfactory system of payment and administration of civilian linguists/interpreters attached to 1 ATF.

Interpreter Requirement

1. The role of 1 Australian Task Force (1 ATF) requires that interpreters be available, for permanent employment, down to platoon level. The operationally desirable allocation is outlined in Appendix A, and totals seventy seven.

Projected Deficiency

2. For planning purposes, the projected deficiency is regarded as being fifty one interpreters. Eighteen Australians from 1 ATF are currently studying Vietnamese at the Armed Forces Language School in Saigon. To meet the immediate requirement for the thirty three extra interpreters, 1 ATF decided to conduct a short course to provide selected soldiers with a basic language knowledge with emphasis on military vocabulary. Experience in other Asian countries has shown that a system of bilingual pairs - one Australian and one indigenous, each with a basic knowledge of the other language - has produced good results; therefore it was decided to train, concurrently, Vietnamese in English and Australians in Vietnamese, so as to produce linguist teams.

OUTLINE OF COMBINED LANGUAGE COURSE

Aim

3. The aim of the course is to provide basic linguist teams which could be employed down to infantry platoon level.

Description of the Course

4. The Popular Forces Training Centre, Vung Tau, was made available as the course site by the Phuoc Tuy Province Chief, Lt Col Dat. 1 Australian Logistic Support Group (ALSG) provides the administrative support for the course while 1 ATF retains operational control.

5. The Phuoc Tuy Province Chief selected thirty Vietnamese Nationals as students; units in 1 ATF were directed to provide an equal number of Australian students. The course commenced on 12 July 66.

6. Teachers, both Vietnamese and Australian, were provided from 1 ATF; the course is commanded by the CC 1 ATF Education Corps increment. The duration of the course is twelve weeks and, on completion, linguist pairs will be allocated to sub-units within 1 ATF.
Current Status of Course

8. A general outline of the course is attached as Annex B.

EMPLOYMENT STATUS AND ADMINISTRATION

Employment Status

9. The proposed terms of employment for the Vietnamese students are attached as Annex C.

Administration

10. At present, payment of the Vietnamese students is being shared by the American Embassy (through their local OSA, and by 1 ATF, (using US supplied intelligence funds). The OSA are paying for twenty of the students, and, 1 ATF the remaining ten. OSA are able to pay both wages and allowances in accordance with Annex C. However, the 1 ATF Intelligence funds are sufficient to pay only in accordance with paragraphs 2 and 3. Therefore the group of ten under the present payment system, would have to be offered lower value terms of employment. Funds, at present, are sufficient to maintain payment at least for the duration of the course.

11. While the generosity of American officials is gratefully acknowledged, to maintain our prestige and full control over these trainee interpreters, it is desirable that full payment for all Vietnamese students be provided from Australian sources.

12. It is recommended that funds be made available to enable 1 ATF to pay the students on the course, and to pay (and provide compensation to) up to 40 linguists (after the course), under terms of employment based on those at Annex C.

Distribution:

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ANNEX C to
HQ 1 ATF R459-1-1
Dated 2 Aug 66

TERMS OF EMPLOYMENT FOR VIETNAMESE LINGUISTS
ATTACHED TO 1 AUSTRALIAN TASK FORCE (1 ATF)

Status

1. Vietnamese civilian linguists employed by 1 ATF are
deemed to be on military service for the purposes of draft
liability, the Phuoc Tuy Province Chief has agreed that four years
service with 1 ATF will constitute four years military service,
and entitle such personnel to draft exemption from future military
service.

Pay

2. While being instructed in English for the twelve weeks
commencing 12 July 66, students will be paid 3,500 piastres for
each completed month. However, students will be fed by the
training school during this period, and, therefore 24,50 piastres/
day will be deducted from their salaries to pay for food.

3. On graduation, successful students may be paid from 4,000
to 10,000 piastres per month depending on their ability. Food will
then be provided by 1 ATF at no cost to the individual.

Clothing, equipment, weapons

4. This will be issued to individuals by 1 ATF. Weapons
will be issued to 1 ATF Linguist Officer Capt Heenan for issue in
turn to students.

Discipline

5. Individuals will be subject to normal civil law for
civil offences.

6. Breaches of military discipline will result in appropriate
pay deductions or dismissal, where appropriate.

Leave

7. Fifteen days leave per year with pay will be granted
under normal circumstances, the year having commenced on 12 July
66. This leave cannot be taken until three months have been served.
If leave is taken before serving a complete year, only that amount
which has been earned may be taken.

8. In exceptional circumstances, such as serious sickness of
parents, wife, or children, up to seven days special leave with pay
may be granted (once per year).

Benefits for next of kin

9. If a linguist is killed on duty with 1 ATF, his nominated
next of kin will be paid the remainder of the months salary, plus
a further twelve months salary plus 5,000 piastres for a coffin.

10. All linguists employed by 1 ATF are to nominate their
next of kin by name, date of birth, identity card number and
photograph. Only one person may be nominated as next of kin and
that person must be either wife, parent or child.

/Military
Military Training

11. At the end of the twelve weeks course, there will be one week of purely military training. Students will then be attached to 1 ATT units for linguists duties.
DAILY TIMETABLE - MON - SAT

0600    Reveille
0700    Breakfast
0800    Tent Inspection
0820    Parade (Paludrin, Admin)
0830    Formal Instruction
1030    Morning Tea
1200    Lunch
1430    Formal Instruction
1600    Organised Sport
1745    Evening Meal
1900    Study
2030    Free Time
2300    Lights Out

DAILY TIMETABLE - SUN

0600    Reveille
0800    Breakfast
0900    Leave Parade
1230    Lunch
1800    Dinner
2400    Lights Out
GENERAL OUTLINE OF 1/66 COMBINED LINGUIST COURSE

Aim: To provide linguists for 1 ATF down to infantry platoon level.

Outline:

Attached as Annex A is a daily timetable of the course. Annex B outlines a weekly timetable.

Vocabulary:

The following words will be taught as a supplement to the vocabulary incorporated in the "Conversational English" textbooks.

Soldier, private, corporal, sergeant, WO, 2Lt, Lt, Capt, Maj, Lt Col, Col, Brigadier, Maj Gen, Lt Gen, Gen Marshall, tent, guard, bed, stretcher, mosquito net, groundsheet, webbing, belt, latrine, shower, table, chair, kitchen, food, jeep, section, platoon, company, battalion, regiment, shirt, socks, boots, truck, weapon, carbine, pistol, automatic, rifle, hand grenade, tunnel, watch, compass, maps, torch, matches, rations, ammouch, FW, prisoner, capture, shoot, fire, hide mortar, beaten zone, grid reference, medic, tank, air support, napalm, bombs, rockets, machine gun, radar, helicopter, jet plane, propeller plane, fighter, transport, L1, L2, radio set, antenna, voice procedure, frequency, tune, switch, battery, wavelength, reinforcement, MEDEVAC, doctor, DUSTOFF.

It is proposed that the course contain as much outdoor work as possible. To achieve this, situations have been planned where students will have to provide a solution and/or written report on an occurrence. It is felt that this way a practical usage of the language will be achieved. Instructors will very carefully assess the response of the student and the accuracy of his statement.

Types of exercises will include;

a. Interrogation of willing "prisoners" who have been briefed on the information that can be given.

b. Situation such as vehicle accidents, houses on fire, bodies, etc.

c. Discussions.

Examinations will be held at regular intervals and while a non-qualifying course, this will serve as an incentive for students and a ready determination by instructors of the students progress.

The daily timetable has been planned so that the midday "siesta" period can be continued. Evening study will be largely non-instructional as assignments will be given. It is expected that Sundays will be free and that leave will be granted. Students will not be granted leave during Mon-Sat.

Sport has been included as a formal period to ensure that physical exercises are not neglected. Swimming and Volley Ball will be the main activities.

Administration:
Administration:

The course will be non-qualifying, but will be entered in AAB 83's under Schools and Courses section.

Vietnamese students will be quartered at the Phuoc Tuy province PF compound and formal instruction of the Vietnamese will also be held there. Australians will be quartered at 1 ALSE and receive instruction there. The course will consolidate for relevant exercises and during latter stages of the courses, Australian/Vietnamese students will be paired off.
The information given in this document is not to be communicated, either directly or indirectly, to the Press or to any person not authorised to receive it.

Serial 9
R0 Nos 28 to 32

AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES
ROUTINE ORDERS PART 1

by

Brigadier O.D. JACKSON, OBE

NUI_DAT
6 AUG 66

CONTENTS
28. BOUNDS
29. ANTI-MALARIAL PRECAUTIONS
30. WEAPON SAFETY
31. AMMUNITION ACCIDENTS/MALFUNCTIONS
32. VEHICLE CHAINS

28. BOUNDS

BAHIA and HOA LONG are out of bounds to all ranks unless on duty.

29. ANTI-MALARIAL PRECAUTIONS

The following mosquito measures must be implemented between 1830 and 0630 hours daily.

1. Proper use of clothing. Malaria carrying mosquitoes bite most frequently between the dusk and dawn, and during this time it is important that as much skin as possible is protected against bites. The proper use of clothing does a great deal to achieve this and the rules are as follows:
   a. sleeves are rolled down and fastened about the wrist
   b. shirts are buttoned up to the neck
   c. long trousers are worn

Good unit discipline is essential if troops are to be afforded maximum protection against mosquitoes by their clothes, and this matter requires the careful supervision of unit officers and NCOs.

2. Mosquito nets. These are used to protect sleeping personnel against mosquito bites and the trailing edges are to be tucked in under the mattress to enclose the sleeper in a mosquito proof "cage". They must be kept in good repair.

     /c) Mosquito
3. Mosquito repellant. The repellant is applied to those areas of the skin which are not covered by the clothes (face, neck, hands and wrists). Mosquitoes will not bite through the skin to which it has been applied. It remains effective on skin for at least three hours, and it must be re-applied accordingly. It should be applied by all ranks who are up and about between dusk and dawn.

4. Suppressive drugs. This consists of administration of paludrine (twice daily) to all ranks. Administration is to be strictly supervised (MBI 142-10). Record is to be kept in unit "Paludrine book". The anti-malarial drug is absorbed into the blood stream and so prevents the development of malaria so long as it is being taken.

30. WEAPON SAFETY

1. Magazines may be placed on weapons in the 1ATP Base Area if so ordered by an officer. Officers should not order weapons to be cocked unless action is imminent.

2. The 1ATP Base Area is designated as that area within the task force perimeter.

31. AMMUNITION ACCIDENTS/MALFUNCTIONS

Ammunition accidents/malfunctions are to be reported immediately through the HQ 1ATP TOC Duty Officer and confirmed in writing.

32. VEHICLE CHAINS

Vehicles will not be fitted with chains unless so ordered by an officer.
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AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES

ROUTINE ORDERS PART 1

by

BRIGADIER C. P. JACKSON, OBE

COMMANDER 1ST AUSTRALIAN TASK FORCE

13 AUG 66

CONTENTS

33. DRESS
34. SALUTING
35. DISCIPLINE
36. 1. ALSG/YUNG TAU
37. VEHICLES
38. A and C

33. DRESS

1. The present standard of dress by some members of 1 ATF when proceeding from 1 ATF to areas outside the base area, and in particular YUNG TAU, BARIA and HOA LONG is not good. As far as possible, clean Jungle Greens are to be worn on these trips. No excuse is acceptable for incorrect dress, and disciplinary action is to be taken by Officers, NCOs and members of 1 ATF Pro/Det against offenders.

2. Shorts. Shorts are not to be worn outside the 1 ATF base area.

34. SALUTING

1. All Officers, including officers of all allied forces, are to be saluted at all times in the following places by persons wearing headgear:
   a. 1 ATF Base Area.
   b. YUNG TAU (both township and 1 ALSG area).
   c. BARIA.

2. Units are responsible for the instruction in recognition of Officer rank of Allied Forces to all members.

35. DISCIPLINE

There have been numerous cases of unsoldierly conduct by members of 1 ATF on leave in and proceeding to and from YUNG TAU. Members of 1 ATF are to be reminded of the standard required and that disciplinary action is to be taken by Officers, NCOs and members of the R/A Pro/Det against offenders.
"161. CURFEW-VUNG TAU PENINSULAR AREA

a. Subject to the qualifications set out hereunder curfew restrictions apply for all troops in the VUNG TAU area from 2100 hrs each day until 0600 hrs the following day.

b. During the periods from 2100 hrs until 2400 hrs on Sun to Fri inclusive in each week and from 2100 hrs on Sat until 0100 hrs on Sun in each week, members of units of 1 ALSG and personnel attached to or allotted for duty with those units on local leave, if absent from unit areas will be in breach of curfew unless located within the confines of one of the following areas or premises, establishments or vessels:

1. 1 ALSG Area.

b. Any premises or protected area leased and controlled by the Australian, American or Korean Services authorities in VUNG TAU.

c. Any Australian, American or Korean Services ship or vessel.

d. The Alaska Serge and Transport Co Club premises in VUNG TAU.

e. Every member on local leave may proceed from one of these locations listed in the preceding para direct to 1 ALSG area by Service transport only.

f. During the hours set out in para b of this order members are not permitted to proceed except in Service transport from bases of the above mentioned areas, premises, establishments, or vessels to another of them.

g. It is an offence for any person to whom this order applies to travel on the VUNG TAU Peninsular other than in Service transport after 2100 hrs on any night.

h. HQ 1 ALSG Routine Order No.130 remains unchanged and should be read in conjunction with the above order. For convenience, the provisions of this Routine Order are set out below:

"130. LOCAL LEAVE

a. Local leave may be granted by COs/OCs units/dates from 1800 hrs to 2359 hrs Mon-Fri and Sun, and 1800 hrs to 0100 hrs Sat.

b. Local leave may also be granted in particular cases by COs/OCs units/dates during daylight hours to soldiers on night shift work. Leave is to cease at least 2 hours prior to resumption of duty.

c. A Leave Pass pro forma will be issued by HQ 1 ALSG to all personnel proceeding on normal leave. This pass will be handed in to the unit Ordnance Room on return from leave. Any person found on leave without a pass may anticipate disciplinary action

/s/ It is the
d. It is the responsibility of COs/OCs units/dets
granting daylight leave to ensure that members are
issued with a leave pass stating times and date leave
is granted from and to.

37. VEHICLES

1. ATF vehicles are to be kept in a reasonably clean and tidy
condition. Vehicles are to be free of rubbish and excess filth.

38. R AND C

R and C is now a minimum period of 48 hrs.
RESTRICTED

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Serial 10
RO No. 33

AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES

ROUTINE ORDERS PART 1

by

Brigadier O.D. JACKSON, CBE

NUI DAT

18 AUG 66

CONTENTS

33. DISCIPLINE

33. DISCIPLINE

2495 Lt Col R.M.C. Cubis, MVO, CO 1 Pd Regt is granted the powers of a Commanding Officer for the purposes of discipline in respect of Det 131 Div Loc Bty RAA with effect from 1 Jun 66.

Maj
GS82
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AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES

ROUTINE ORDERS PART 1

by

Brigadier G.D. JACKSON, OBE

NUI DAT

20 AUG 66

CONTENTS

34. CONGRATULATIONS

34. CONGRATULATIONS

1. For Brigadier Jackson. The Prime Ministers Press Secretary has asked that the following message be despatched to you. "Our forces in their latest engagement have acquitted themselves with skill effectiveness and high courage in the best Australian tradition. Please tell them that Australia is proud of them. I have publicly expressed my sympathy to the bereaved. My sympathy goes also to the wounded. I send them best wishes for speedy recovery. Signed Harold Holt Prime Minister".

2. Following message received in Canberra from COMUS MACV. "For General Mackay from General Westmoreland. Your troops have won a spectacular victory over the enemy near BANNA. Aggressiveness, quick reaction, good use of fire power, and old fashioned Australian courage have produced outstanding results. Heartiest congratulations".

3. Following message sent from Canberra to COMUS MACV. "For General Westmoreland from Mackay. Your personal message conveying your praise and congratulations on victory in Phuoc Tuy was received with pleasure and pride and will be appreciated especially by the troops and the people of Australia."

4. For Comd 1 ATF. "Comd ADF adds his personal congratulations to you and all ranks Australian Force particularly 6 RAR and supporting ground and air elements on their magnificent performance and achievement."

5. From Maj Gen Scaman. "Please pass on to the 6th Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment, my heartiest congratulations for the outstanding results obtained during Operation SMITHFIELD. The large number of enemy killed as compared to the light casualties of the Australians is indicative of the professionalism of your Task Force. I especially want to congratulate D Company for its outstanding performance during this operation."
RESTRICTED

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Serial 12
RO No 35

AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES

ROUTINE ORDERS PART 1

by

Brigadier C.D. JACKSON, CBE

HUI DAT
29 AUG 66

CONTENTS

35. DRESS

35. DRESS

1. It seems that the Dengue and Encephalitis carrying mosquito bite during daylight hours.

2. In order to minimise exposure shirts are to be worn at all times by all ranks and the wearing of shorts is forbidden until further notice.

NOTICE

The following message was received from Lieutenant General COA VAN VIEW, Chief of JGS/RVNAR:

"I wish to express the gratitude of the people and the Armed Forces of Viet-Nam for the courageous and highly successful performance of the men of the Australian Task Force during Operation SMITHFIELD. Their action demonstrated to our enemies and to the world the professional competence of your troops and their determination to help our nation in the preservation of its freedom. We share the pride of your people in the accomplishments of your brave soldiers; we also share the grief of the families of those who lost their lives in this action and other actions. We hope for the speedy and satisfactory recovery of those who suffered wounds."

Maj
GSO2
RESTRICTED

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Serial 18
RO No 77

AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES

ROUTINE ORDERS PART 1

by

MAJOR R.R. HANNAHAN

COMMANDING OFFICER HQ 1ST AUSTRALIAN TASK FORCE

NUI DAT

6 A U G 6 6

CONTENTS

77. DUTY OFFICERS ROSTER

77. DUTY OFFICERS ROSTER

072000CH to 080100CHLt WEINHEIMER
080100CH to 080600CHCapt HUTCHISON
080600CH to 090100CHLt LORD
090100CH to 090600CHLt HARRIS
090600CH to 100100CHLt KAMENEK
100100CH to 100600CHCapt ANDERSON
100600CH to 110100CHCapt STEVENSON
110100CH to 110600CHCapt HEDMAN
110600CH to 120100CHCapt HEMING
120100CH to 120600CHCapt TUCKER
120600CH to 130100CHLt WHITE
130100CH to 130600CHCapt ELAND
130600CH to 140100CHCapt STEELE
140100CH to 140600CHCapt HOLDFORD

Capt
GS03

RESTRICTED
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Serial 19
RO No 78

AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES

ROUTINE ORDERS PART 1

by

MAJOR R.R. HANNIGAN

COMMANDING OFFICER HQ 1ST AUSTRALIAN TASK FORCE

HUI DAT

13 AUG 66

CONTENTS

78. DUTY OFFICERS ROSTER

78. DUTY OFFICERS ROSTER

142000H to 150100H Capt GOODWIN
150100H to 150600H Capt HUTCHISON
152000H to 150100H Lt WEINHEIMER
160100H to 160600H Lt HARRIS
162000H to 170100H Lt LOBB
170100H to 170600H Capt STEVENSON
172000H to 180100H Lt KAMENAK
180100H to 180600H Capt ANDERSON
182000H to 190100H Capt HEMING
190100H to 190600H Capt HEENAN
192000H to 200100H Capt BLAND
200100H to 200600H Capt TUCKER
202000H to 210100H Capt STEELE
210100H to 210600H Lt WHITE

Capt GSO?
RESTRICTED

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Serial 19
RO No 78

AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES
ROUTINE ORDERS PART 1

by

MAJOR R.R. HANNIGAN

COMMANDING OFFICER HQ 1ST AUSTRALIAN TASK FORCE

NUI DAT
20 AUG 66

CONTENTS

78. DUTY OFFICERS ROSTER

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Capt
GS03
NOTES FROM COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE 3 AUG 66

WESTMORELAND'S LETTER

1. Importance of quick and accurate reporting of information.

2. Interdiction of VC supply lines. Possibility of returning a company to an area after a battalion operation.

NEWS

3. Newsweek to be published weekly. VC Scoreboard to be included. Challenging topics to be raised.

USE OF AIR

4. Junior commanders lack confidence in calling for air strikes. Demonstration of close air support required.

D445 Bn

5. More skilful than Local Guerillas.

6. Used bugles to give signals.

7. One 60mm mortar fired about 30 rounds. Difficult to tell where they were coming from.

DEPLOYMENT PROCEDURE

8. Must be done at crawl in close country. People who stand up run the risk of being shot.

9. This applies particularly to section commanders moving forward to check situation with forward scouts.

FIRE DISCIPLINE

10. Need for more flexible approach to our doctrine of only firing when you see a target. Often fire must be directed at general areas. This is sound providing section commander can still exercise control.

PACE OF OPERATIONS

11. Has been heavy especially for infantry battalions particularly 5 RAR. Should ease up after Op VAUCLUSE.

DUC THANH GUARD

12. 1 ATF will undertake from 3 Sep.

INFORMATION FROM SECTOR

13. To be passed on to battalions with 1 ATF comments.

RECOGNITION COLOURS

14. Both infantry battalions will use red hatbands from 4 Aug 66. GSOs will decide when it is be worn.

RVE

15. M16s to replace all OMCs in 1 ATP. GSO2 to advise AFV and check on stocks available in ordnance.
BASE AREA DEFENCE

16. Eng to plan on leaving certain numbers of persons behind when going on ops.

17. GS02 to check on RVE for additional MGs.

FREQ ALLOCATION

18. Bde Sig Offr to hold a conference with bn and Fd Regt Sig Offrs prior to freq change each month.

19. Present call system for DUSTOFF to remain.

RAAF

20. Pilots to attend unit debriefs.

21. To be invited to go with battalions on operations.

STAND TO

22. Present morning "Stand To" to be replaced by 0615 hours Reveille. Units occupying perimeter positions will remain at alert from this time until their clearing patrols are in.

RADIO AERIALIS 292

23. 20 for TF required immediately.

SOCKS

24. Desperate shortage at present. Holdings to be checked.

CP LIGHTING

25. 10 set batteries urgently required. Check load time on generators.

VEHICLE REPLACEMENT

26. Replacements urgently required. G release will be given.

WATER TRUCKS

27. Progress to be checked.

RATIONS

28. Possibility of delivery to unit lines to be investigated.

RAASC CONVOY

29. Time of arrival to be notified night before.

R AND C CENTRE

30. Stopover period to be 48 hours now until further advised.

STARLIGHT SCOPE

31. 86 coming this month. Allocation to be made.

OP OFFICERS

32. Shortage may occur in changeover 105 Bty. CO Fd Regt will endeavour to overcome.
EXCHANGE OF SOLDIERS

33. Arty/Inf - To be encouraged.

PSCC

34. Arty require replacement for communications they are providing for RAAF.

Distribution

Comd
CO 5 RAR
CO 6 RAR
CO 1 Ed Regt
GS02 (Ops)
GS02 (Int)
DAA & QMG
File
CONFIDENTIAL

HQ 1 ATP - NUI DAT

TROOPS INFORMATION SHEET

No 4

Period: 8th - 14th August 1966

WARNING

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(G.D. Jackson)
Brigadier
Commander 1 ATP

OFFICIAL

JOHN S. ROWE
Major
S-2

Distribution: List B, plus one per Platoon/Troop Commander
List D

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

Section 1. III CORPS AREA

(A) Enemy Force Activity

1. VC activity followed a popular pattern of small scale attacks, ambushes, sabotage and harassment in III Corps during the reporting period. There were several significant VC initiated incidents however, and Phu Ky continued to be a major target.

2. Elements of the US 1st Division detected and maneuvered against a VC company in the vicinity of YTP34448 on the 6th of August. The VC employed SA's, rifle grenades, and 4 machine guns. They were dressed in khaki uniforms with grey silk helmets. Artillery, USAR and USN tactical air supported friendly forces and the VC broke contact after 90 minutes of action. Friendly losses incurred were: 1 US KIA, 16 US WIA - enemy losses were: 3 KIA(25) and 25 KIA (POSS).

3. On the 10th of August, the 1st Bn company of the 48th Inf Regt (ARNV) was attacked on Highway 15 (Y2380660) by an estimated VC battalion. The VC used SA, AV, 60mm mortar and 75mm and 75mm recoilless rifles. The ARVN unit was supported by light fire teams and tactical air. The VC unit, later identified as the 265th battalion of the 274th Regt, withdrew North-East along the stream line after 2 hours of contact. The 2/48th ARVN conducted a sweep of the area but failed to make contact. Friendly forces suffered losses of 5 KIA and 10 WIA whilst the VC lost 30 KIA(30).

4. The 46th ARVN company at Phu Ky (Y237766) was attacked by an estimated VC battalion on the 14th of August. The enemy force employed SA and AV and hit the area with 30 rounds of 81mm mortar. The company was supported by tactical air, 3 guns and a flak ship. The VC broke contact after 90 minutes of action with unknown casualties. 1 US was WIA, 1 ARVN KIA, 12 ARVN WIA, 3 civilians killed and 12 wounded as a result of this attack.

(B) Friendly Force Activity

5. US/FW operations in III Corps continued to make only sporadic contact with enemy forces and consequently casualties were light. During the reporting period the following search and destroy and other operations, either continued through, were initiated, or were terminated:

<table>
<thead>
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<th>OPERATION</th>
<th>PROVINCE</th>
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<tr>
<td>Monticino</td>
<td>Bi Long/Bi Long</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pu Dorado</td>
<td>Bi Long</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urgon</td>
<td>Bi Long</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free Port</td>
<td>Hau Nghia</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sahu</td>
<td>Tay Kinh</td>
<td>25th Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lohaina</td>
<td>Hau Nghia</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aiea</td>
<td>Hau Nghia</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toledo</td>
<td>Bi Long/Long Khanh</td>
<td>173rd Abu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holsworthy</td>
<td>Phuoc Thuy</td>
<td>1 ATP</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: These were supplemented by some 25 RVNAF operations active during the reporting period - the majority of which were of one to two day duration only.

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6. Cumulative (C) and final (F) losses incurred by the VC during these operations are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Casualties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Evansville</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>3 KIA, 1 VCC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Paso</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>N11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LaM Sen II</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>14 KIA, 52 VCC, 714 VGS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manitowoc</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>1 KIA, 1 VCC, 3 VGS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Dorado</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>6 KIA, 1 VCC, 2 VGS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akron</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>N11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freeport</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>6 KIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oahu</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>3 KIA, 1 KIA, 1 VCC, 12 VGS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laihena</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>1 KIA, 3 VCC, 13 VGS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aiea</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>3 KIA, 2 VCC, 13 VGS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toledo</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>N11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holsworthy</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>17 VCC, 77 VGS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dong Da</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>12 KIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dan Tam 67</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>38 KIA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Section 2. SOUTH VIETNAM (EXCL III CORPS) AND NORTH VIETNAM

(A) Enemy Force Activity

7. There were no large scale VC initiated actions against friendly forces throughout the remainder of South Vietnam during the period under review.

8. Country-wide, the level of enemy initiated activity decreased in both volume and in intensity. However, enemy terrorism will probably continue, as will attempts to increase strengths by infiltration and conscription. The VC will probably continue to harass and conduct sabotage against airfields and logistic bases in all Corps areas.

9. The most likely areas for large scale attacks are in Northern I Corps (Quang Tri Province), in II Corps (Western Pleiku, Binh Dinh and Phu Yen Provinces), and III Corps (Binh Long, Phuoc Long and Tay Ninh Provinces).

10. VC Tactics. Interrogation of a 12 year old VGS in I Corps revealed that children in the area have been taught simple English phrases like "Do you remember your home?" and "Do you remember your wife?" and are instructed to use these phrases when among USMC troops. If a Marine asked if any VC are in the area children are taught to answer, "No, the people here are honest to make a living". The children are also taught to gather around and delay US troops as they enter the village and to shout "Hello, hello" as a warning to nearby VC. Children are taught basic methods of espionage and are given missions to observe USMC arms and strength. The VC also promised to give the children poison to mix with the food and water consumed by USMC troops.

J-2 MACV Comment. There have been other reports of children sketching USMC positions in the Danang area, allegedly in preparation for mortar attacks.

11. The VC have reportedly infiltrated teenage trainees into Saigon to assassinate US and RVN military personnel. Two squads of VC trainees, 13 to 15 years of age, will reportedly use "pocket pistols" to perform assassinations as directed by VC cadre. J-2 MACV Comment. Several reports have indicated VC plans to assassinate friendly forces in order to lower morale and to retaliate for stepped-up bombing of RVN. The "pocket pistols" were not further described in the report, however, several single-shot hand guns, shaped like fountain pens, have been captured from VC personnel. It is possible that this is the weapon planned for use by the teenagers.
VC Underground Supply Structures

12. The VC commonly use small individual caches in forward areas, since these hiding places can be prepared with simple hand tools in or near the local VC’s home. Like all VC supply structures, their size and construction varies according to local needs and materials but most of them are large enough to store food and weapons for a number of persons. These supply structures are well suited for guerrilla warfare because they are easily accessible and hard to detect.

13. More substantial underground structures are found in both populated villages and sparsely inhabited districts in the VC safe zones. The VC capitalize on existing underground storage areas previously built by local inhabitants to safeguard family food supplies. When necessary, the VC use forced civilian labor for improvement of existing structures and new construction. These structures are prepared with simple hand tools and their size is dictated by the quantity of supplies to be stored. Some underground facilities as large as 2,700 cubic meters have been reported but normally they are much smaller, one to two cubic meters.

14. All caches are well concealed or camouflaged, and protected. If the storage area is under a house or barn the entrance is probably concealed with mats, furniture, cooking utensils or on an earth cover. If outside, the camouflage may consist of dirt, leaves, brush, manure piles, artificial grave mounds, ant hills or natural growths. River banks and rice field dikes are also likely places for underground caches. In all cases, outdoor underground storage structures are camouflaged with natural materials and blend with the surroundings.

15. Caches found in village areas are guarded by the inhabitants and are seldom mined or booby trapped. Storage facilities located anywhere outside populated areas are normally mined and booby trapped.

16. Frequently, prior to the storage of food, the VC kindle a fire within the storage hole to dry the interior and prevent food spoilage. Otherwise there is no major difference between the type of structure used for food, storage and the type used for weapons and ammunition storage. Due to the soil composition in some areas of the country, primarily I Corps, internal breathing is required to prevent the dirt walls from caving in. Recent reports indicate that the VC may be attempting to overcome this problem by constructing concrete lined pits with concrete covers for use as caches.

17. The main advantage of underground structures is their relative immunity to aerial and surface detection and artillery fire. The primary disadvantages are the time and labor required for construction and the inherent dampness, particularly during the rainy season, which promotes rapid food spoilage and corrosion of supplies (CICV Special Study).

VC/NVA OR in South Vietnam

18. Accredited Enemy Strength:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VC/NVA</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NVA Combat Troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>VC Combat Troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Militia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Combat Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political Cadre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Major Unit Listings: 6 Divisions; 19 NVA Regiments - 13 VC Regiments.
**Friendly Force Activity.**

The following US/AN Search and Destroy and other operations either continued through, or were initiated, or were terminated during the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OPERATION</th>
<th>ORG</th>
<th>PROVINCE</th>
<th>US/AN UNIT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prairie</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>Quang Tri</td>
<td>4th Marine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colorado</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>Quang Tin</td>
<td>RVNAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Lien K65</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>Quang Nam</td>
<td>9th Marine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macau</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>Quang Nam</td>
<td>1st Marine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ducks</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>Quang Nam</td>
<td>9th Marine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wilcox</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>Quang Nam</td>
<td>3rd Marine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suwane</td>
<td>II</td>
<td>Pleiku</td>
<td>1st Air Cav</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Paul Revere II</td>
<td>II</td>
<td>Pleiku</td>
<td>ROK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Ben Kae</td>
<td>II</td>
<td>Phu Yen</td>
<td>161st ABn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Paul Jones</td>
<td>II</td>
<td>Binh Dinh</td>
<td>1st Air Cav</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benning IV</td>
<td>II</td>
<td>Binh Dinh</td>
<td>ROK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Su Ai</td>
<td>II</td>
<td>Binh Dinh</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ho Do XII</td>
<td>II</td>
<td>Binh Dinh</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note** (a) *Associated Operations.*

(b) Additionally, 12 RVNAF operations were active in I Corps, 18 in II Corps, and 22 in IV Corps during the reporting period. The majority of these were of one to two day duration only.

Several heavy contacts were made with VC forces, and as a result, enemy casualties increased by some 750 over the previous reporting period. The majority of enemy force casualties were light to moderate in comparison. Cumulative friendly force casualties were light to moderate in comparison. Cumulative (c) and final (d) losses by enemy forces are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORG</th>
<th>(C)</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>VCC</th>
<th>VCS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colombo</td>
<td>(C)</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Lien K65</td>
<td>(C)</td>
<td>504</td>
<td>75</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prairie</td>
<td>(C)</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macau</td>
<td>(C)</td>
<td>556</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suwane</td>
<td>(C)</td>
<td>68</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Paul Revere II</td>
<td>(C)</td>
<td>556</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benning IV</td>
<td>(C)</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Paul Jones</td>
<td>(C)</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Su Ai</td>
<td>(C)</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dan Ai 67</td>
<td>(P)</td>
<td>38</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dan Ai 252</td>
<td>(P)</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dan Ai 101</td>
<td>(P)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

21. **FAVHR.** Two significant trends which may be contributive to paywar operations have been reported recently. Firstly, raffles have brought in more weapons when detecting and decollating, aircraft on paywar missions have received ground fire from areas that were quite previously. **MAC-V CORRESPONDENT**

This trend may indicate an increased concern by VC commanders as to the vulnerability of their troops to paywar operations.

(c) **North Vietnam**

22. In Air Force and Navy pilots bombing North Vietnam on 12th August met a lethal blast from ground fire, MiGs-17s and Russian-built surface-to-air missiles. Two American planes were downed by ground fire, bringing the weekly total to 13 and the overall total to 330 since the air war began. In return, two MiGs were shot up and flew from Thunderchiefs after a four-minute battle.
23. Saigon, August 13th. South Vietnamese Prime Minister, Nguyen Cao Ky declared that he believed that North Vietnam would accept defeat within the next two or three years, or maybe earlier. Ky also repeated the statement made earlier in Manila that a partial withdrawal of US troops from Vietnam could be carried out in two years.

24. "We have made a lot of progress militarily, economically, and politically in the past 14 months. If we can continue this progress I believe we will be strong enough to defend ourselves", Ky said. He also said that he felt one of the most important things that would lead to stabilisation in South Vietnam would be the elections in September for a Constituent Assembly and the final elections in 1967.
The Great Water Treatment - or - You Can't Keep Big Ming Down

1. When I am old and grey and full of cognac, with grandchildren of all sizes flocking around my pedal shanks begging for a bedtime story, it will be my especial pleasure to tell them the fabulous tale of the Great Water Treatment.

2. It all started, dwarfs (I shall say), one morning back in the year 1966. Then it was that Chairman Mao did his historic bellyflop into the river Yangtze, and dog-paddled upstream for a mile or so, amid the deafening cheers of the adoring classes.

3. What did Chairman Mao think himself in the river Yangtze on that chilly July morning? Well, it seems that the rumor was getting around at the time that Chairman Mao had had it - to paraphrase the old Chinese expression of the day, in other words, that he was due to join his ancestors. So, in order to give the lie to this surperty, the determined old gentleman plunged into the drink and performed his celebrated swim.

4. Chairman Mao's gesture excited great admiration throughout the entire habitable world and the State of Victoria. And the Peking Post declared that his aquatic demonstration "brought great joy to the humble hearts of the citizens of the Chinese People's Republic". Chairman Mao did not realize, however, that he had set a precedent which Western capitalists, in their snaky, imperialistic fashion, were quick to follow.

5. Some time after Chairman Mao's immersion a similar sort of rumour began drifting through the continent of Australia - whose ex-chairman Bob (founder of the Ming Dynasty) had for long been mysteriously absent in the butt-end of England, at prison-house called Cinque Ports, of which he was head warder. It began to be whispered, in fact, that ex-chairman Bob had also had it. Otherwise why was he not back in his beloved Melbourne, taking his ease in his new shack in Havelock Avenue?

6. When ex-chairman Bob heard of this rumour he was not tardy in following Chairman Mao's bold example. And one windy morning, accompanied by a pipe band and drum majorettes, a poetically figure sporting neck-to-knee bloomers and a pair of water-sippers, marched down to Dover pier, and hurled itself into the English Channel.

7. Later, some miles off Calais, the mate of a small fishing smack called to his captain - "Thar she blows - it's a whale!" "No it's not. It's a Cinque Port porpoise," said the skipper. "No it's not - its ex-chairman Bob" cried the mate. And so it was. News of this event brought great joy to the humble hearts of the citizens of Footscray and Malvern. "Bob's in his heaven, all's alright with the world," they said. But not to the citizens of the Chinese Republic.

8. "Those Western imperialists have already pinched our gunpowder, our water-clock and our ship oars", they grumbled. "Now they have knocked the Iceberg Act". There was worse to come. Late in July, Chairman Harold retired with spear gun and brief-case to his usual cranny on the Queensland coast to prepare the People's budget.

9. He was absent for so long however, that a persistent buzz soon made itself heard in the nation's capitals. "He's been taken by a crocodile", people said. "There'll be no budget this year, mark my words". Then, of course, came that unforgettable day, early in August, when Chairman Harold, escorted by a convoy of premier vessels, slipped majestically down Sydney Harbour, with the People's budget lashed to his snorkel. This also brought great joy to the humble hearts of the electorate, and even Arthur Calwell could scarce forbear to cheer.
The other incidents, as you know, have passed into history; as the occasion when Commissioner Baume gave further proof of his undiminished vigour by leaping, fully-clad, into the Archibald Fountain. And when Dita Cobb refuted the rumour that she had fractured another petticoat by diving into the Tank Stream. Meantime, dearies, your old Grandpa is getting just a bit dry in the gizzard. Bessie, go and uncork another bottle of Courvoisier, there's a good girl. (By Alexander Macdonald - Sydney Sun).

Editorial Comment

11. The much-publicised swimming of the Yangtze river by Mao Tse-tung is a fine example of the contrasting skill and naivety of Red propaganda. Most of the millions of people had earlier been told the 72-year-old Mao was ill and now pretty sure that he's well.

12. All the world loves garrulity - Australians more than most - and the picture of a game old man swimming one of the world's great rivers got the message over magnificently. And it was embroidered in a way to make a Western HIC envious - Mao cracking jokes and teaching a little Chinese girl to swim on her back.

13. For a Western parallel, one must imagine de Gaulle swimming the Seine, LBJ the Mississippi, or Sir Robert Menzies taking off his cocked hat and plunging into the Straits of Dover. So far so good - message received. But the Chinese now become so naive they all but destroy the effect of a highly original stunt.

14. We are told Mao's swim has been a heavy blow to imperialism, modern revisionism and monsters and freaks who oppose socialism. This is unmitigated rubbish to the average Western mind, non-politically fascinated by a personal Hellsinki achieved in life's evening. It should remind us that, as well as being dangerous, Communism is insufferably dull and humourless.

The Role of Airpower in Vietnam

(By John Dille - Life Magazine)

1. Of all the many factors about the war in Vietnam which have confused and disturbed observers outside the battle area, none has been less understood, and less adequately reported, than the growing role of airpower in that war. Starting in the winter of 1961 with a dozen old-fashioned B-26s and T-28s (which were used primarily to teach green South Vietnamese student pilots how to fly their own air war) the U.S. has gradually increased its commitment in men and equipment until today a total of 6,200 U.S. pilots and about 3,000 aircraft are directly involved in combat or support missions against targets in North and South Vietnam. This commitment has been so active and intense that 378 U.S. aircraft have been lost over Vietnam.

2. Despite this increased pressure, the war goes on. And it is this fact which has caused so much confusion and concern. To many it seems incomprehensible that a powerful nation which helped to destroy the German Ruhr with bombs and then brought Japan to her knees with air power cannot pulverise North Vietnam in the same way and quickly wind up the fighting. Others, impatient for peace, find it equally disturbing that a nation which espouses peace so fervently and practices so much humanity in other fields could bring itself to drop searing blobs of napalm on "innocent" civilians and bomb out "innocent" villages. It is my contention that both of these assumptions are in fact misconceptions, and I will endeavour to explain the true situation by describing just what U.S. airpower is up to in Vietnam.
3. It might be useful to note at the start what U.S. airpower is not up to in Vietnam. Despite a certain amount of propaganda to the contrary from professional airpower enthusiasts, there has never been any serious thought among senior U.S. officers that planes and bombs could win the war in Vietnam all by themselves. The conflict is much too complicated for that. It is basically a guerilla war, and as such it must finally be won on the ground—among the people and by the people. But it has also been clearly demonstrated in recent months that the war cannot be won without airpower, and that without the extensive use of aircraft the battle would have been lost long ago. It is, in fact, the calculated mixture of men on the ground and planes in the air, both working together in the closest harmony and combination, that has staved off defeat for the South Vietnamese and their allies time after time, raised their morale, helped keep them on the offensive and thrown the Vietcong into such frequent disarray that they have been unable so far to mount a final assault of their own.

4. The essential value of an airplane in combat is that it provides a mobility and flexibility of firepower to help match or even overcome the mobility and flexibility of the enemy. The lightly armed and elusive Vietcong is a highly mobile fellow. He is also cunningly flexible in his ability to utilize the terrain—which is after all his terrain. And he has made a specialty of popping up out of nowhere, mounting a vicious and often stunning attack, and then scrambling out of night again. He is a master of tactics which make him nearly as difficult to pin down from the air as on the ground.

5. But the U.S. has now spent nearly five years—the longest continuous period of aerial warfare in U.S. Air Force history—trying to perfect new tactics of its own to cope with the Vietcong. Ever in history has any nation utilized its military aircraft in so many different ways, for so many varied purposes, with such severe and determined restraint, and—considering the circumstances—with such abundant success as pilots from the U.S. Air Force, Navy, Army and Marines in the skies over Vietnam.

6. To see this in a quick perspective, the following summarizes the major uses of airpower in Vietnam:
   a. The military intelligence that helps prevent units from being cut off or ambushed by the enemy is gathered largely from the air. The planes being employed include little Cessna O-1 spotter aircraft that fly low and slow over the landscape watching for sudden or suspicious movements in the brush and larger twin-engine Mohawk surveillance planes that are equipped with aerial cameras during the day and at night with infra-red sensors which can detect a lurking enemy unit by the faint heat of its campfires. The Army Mohawks are so hated and feared by the enemy that the Vietcong has a standing offer of 50,000 piasters (about $400) for any Vietcong gunner who brings one down.
   b. To harass the Vietcong in the immediate vicinity of units—and try to make them give themselves away—the Air Force and Army collaborate in a game called "Hunter-Killer". First, a lone helicopter wanders into an area where it is suspected that the Vietcong are hiding and acts as a decoy. If the Vietcong take the bait and try to shoot the copter down, its pilot radio for help and Air Force fighters already in the air roar in quickly to plaster the hideout.
   c. To limit the flow on enemy men and supplies at night, the Air Force engages in what it calls "Snake Hunt". Because much of this enemy traffic moves over the rivers and waterways, U.S. cargo planes fly over first to drop huge flares that light up the water and any sampans that happen to be gliding along it. (Local government authorities place a curfew on sampans after dark, so any which show up are presumed illegal). Then a weird and fabulous aircraft named "Puff, the Magic Dragon" enters the game. This is a military version of the reliable old DC-3 (Dakota)
which has been specially fitted out with three monstrous Gatling guns pointing out of the windows on one side. Each gun can fire up to 6,000 rounds of tracer ammunition per minute which provides a stream of destructive fire that looks to the frightened enemy down below like the tongue of an angry dragon. Vietcong sampan operators soon learn to stay home.

d. To soften up the enemy in other ways, the Air Force also engages in various kinds of psychological warfare. Millions of leaflets are dropped over hostile areas each month, denouncing recent Vietcong atrocities or government victories and serving as surrender passes to any Vietcong who wish to give up. Other planes mount loudspeakers that blare down everything from suggestive funeral dirges to an appeal from a recent defector who describes how nice it is to be on the government side and how well he is being treated.

e. To uncover the enemy’s favorite hiding places under the thick canopy of jungle leaves, cargo planes equipped like crop dusters fly low over the treetops to spray a defoliating agent that will kill the growth and force the enemy to move on.

f. To harass or hopefully destroy large enemy concentrations known to be holed up in the deeper, more impenetrable jungles, flights of giant eight-engine B-52 jet bombers fly regular missions from Guam, 2,400 miles away, and drop a wide variety of non-nuclear bombs that can obliterate an entire camp within a few seconds or penetrate the deepest bunkers and tunnels where the Vietcong are hiding.

g. To slow down the flow of enemy troops and supplies inside North Vietnam, smaller Air Force and Navy jets have the heavy antiaircraft defenses - including Soviet SAM missiles - to knock out arsenals, storage dumps, key bridges, railroads and other "choke points" where the enemy logistics can be bottled up.

h. To protect these bomb-laden planes and their pilots, highly maneuverable Air Force and Navy Phantom interceptors roam the skies over North Vietnam to tangle with the Communist MiGs which finally summoned up enough courage and training experience last year to strike back at the U.S. raiders.

i. To spot the targets in North Vietnam, Air Force RF-101 jet Voodooos fly over the area in pairs equipped with cameras to record the changing terrain down below.

k. To help defend all of these aircraft from the Soviet-built MiGs and antiaircraft missiles that lie in wait for them, specially equipped RB-66 and EC-121 aircraft go along at the same time, loaded with complex electronics equipment which can pinpoint the location of enemy planes and missile sites, warn the fighter pilots about them and then try to thwart the enemy's counterattack by jamming his communications and radar guidance systems.

l. To knock out specific targets like radar stations and thus chip away at the enemy's air defenses, P-100 Supersabre jets fly at the targets with Bullpup guided missiles.

m. To protect ground troops in the event enemy MiGs try to attack in South Vietnam, Air Force F-102 jet interceptors are on constant alert.

n. To extend the range of the B-52s and many of the smaller aircraft, great, lumbering KC-135 jet Stratotankers set up mobile, unmanned filling stations in the sky which can refuel the bombers whenever they are running low.
o. To come to the rescue of the pilots in any of these aircraft in the event they are shot down, special U.S. air rescue units are on constant alert to pick up the pilots at sea after they have parachuted, or - if the pilots can't make it to the sea - from a jungle clearing, often under heavy fire.

7. The collective impact of all these interlocking activities in the air has had a profound effect on the fortunes of war in Vietnam. As the result of a steady escalation in the use of airpower, more Vietcong and North Vietnamese regulars are being killed from the air than on the ground. This pressure from the skies has helped to swing the balance on the ground away from the Vietcong and in favor of the side using the air. For the first time in history, airpower has begun to prove effective against a guerrilla army. The most persuasive testimony to this effect has come not from prejudiced proponents of airpower but from the Vietcong themselves. A majority of the enemy prisoners captured during the past year admit that they have been under withering air attack a number of times - which may explain why they no longer try to ambush a U.S. or South Vietnamese troop convoy when they know aircraft are available to protect it. Two-thirds of the prisoners who have been interrogated rate the airplane as unquestionably the most difficult weapon that they have ever had to cope with in combat.
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TROOPS INFORMATION SHEET

No. 5

Period: 15th - 21st August 1966

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(O.D. Jackson)
Brigadier
Commander 1 ATF

OFFICIAL

JOHN S ROWE
Major
S2

Distribution: List B, plus two per Platoons/Troop Commander
List D

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Section 1

III Corps Area

(A) Enemy Force Activity

1. Enemy small scale attacks, ambushes, sabotage, terrorism and harassment in III Corps intensified during the reporting period. Of the several larger scale attacks mounted against friendly forces, the more significant occurred in our own Tactical Area of Responsibility.

2. During the hours of 0240H and 0300H on the morning of the 17th of August, the 1 ATF Base Camp received an estimated 66 rounds of 82mm mortar and 5 rounds of 70mm artillery fire in vicinity YS4366. Four mortar positions were found in vicinity YS4359671, and it is believed that some mortar fire was received from the West of the Task Force position. The 70mm artillery is believed to have come from YS461669. 1 ATF artillery fired upon suspected VC positions with unknown results.

3. On the 18th August, D/6 RAR made contact with an estimated two enemy battalions in vicinity YS478673. D Company were later supported by A/6 RAR, APO's, Artillery and airstrikes. Some time after contact the engagement was paused Operation Smithfield and finally involved 6 RAR and elements of 5 RAR. The VC force was believed to be 275 Regiment supported by NVA 605 Battalion and Local Provincial Mobile D45 Battalion.

4. On the 17th of August a PF platoon was ambushed by an estimated 2 VC platoons at a roadblock in vicinity XS025820. As a result 14 PF were KIA, 12 PF WIA and 34 weapons lost. A PF platoon and 60-man RF force were dispatched as a reaction force. They were supported by artillery, a light fire team and VNAP/USAF airstrikes. The reaction force had light contact in which no casualties were sustained by either side.

5. An estimated 2 VC companies, disguised as Marines and Rangers and using 3 motorised boats, attacked a rural reconstruction group and the 867th RF Company at Long Thanh My (YS000998) on 19th August. Friendly losses were 11 KIA (2 civilians) and 13 WIA (5 civilians) - enemy losses 6 KIA (possible).

6. On 21st August an estimated 2 VC companies attacked an RF outpost in the vicinity X0730800 and elements of the 30th Ranger Battalion at a bridge in vicinity X0750830. The VC split into two groups and withdrew to the South-East. As a result 5 ARVN KIA, 8 ARVN WIA and 4 RF WIA - enemy casualties unknown.

(B) Friendly Force Activity

7. US/FW operations made only sporadic contact with enemy forces during the reporting period and casualties were light on both sides - one exception was Operation Smithfield. The following operations either continued through, or were initiated, or were terminated in III Corps area:-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Province</th>
<th>US/FW Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>El Paso III</td>
<td>Binh Long</td>
<td>US 1st Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lea 3rd II</td>
<td>Binh Duong</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gallup</td>
<td>Binh Duong</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bellat</td>
<td>Binh Duong</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evansville</td>
<td>Binh Duong</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brooke</td>
<td>Binh Duong</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Castine</td>
<td>Binh Duong</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oahu</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aiea</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue Jay</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tola to Binh Tuy/Lang Khant/Phuoc Tuy</td>
<td>US 196th Inf Bde</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holsworthy</td>
<td>Phuoc Tuy</td>
<td>1 ATF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smithfield</td>
<td>Phuoc Tuy</td>
<td>1 ATF</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Note: These operations were supplemented by 25 ARVN operations active during the period.

Final (F) and cumulative (C) losses by enemy forces are as under:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>(F)</th>
<th>(C)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Evansville</td>
<td>3 KIA, 1 VCC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gallup</td>
<td>NIL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belfast</td>
<td>NIL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holsworthy</td>
<td>2 KIA, 17 VCC, 77 VCS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smithfield</td>
<td>245 KIA, 3 VCC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lahaina</td>
<td>1 KIA, 3 VCC, 16 VCS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aisa</td>
<td>7 KIA, 6 VCC, 25 VCS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oahu</td>
<td>8 KIA, 2 VCC, 15 VCS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Paso III</td>
<td>NIL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Las Vegas</td>
<td>14 KIA, 58 VCC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toledo</td>
<td>2 KIA, 7 VCC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broome</td>
<td>NIL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuatine</td>
<td>2 KIA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An Dan 175</td>
<td>37 KIA, 2 VCC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35/6/LLDB</td>
<td>24 KIA, 1 VCC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Section 2  South Vietnam (excl III Corps) and North Vietnam

(4) Enemy Force Activity

9. There were no large scale enemy initiated attacks directed against friendly forces throughout the remainder of South Vietnam during the period under review. Generally, small scale attacks - sabotage, ambush, terrorism and harassment - continued at a high level of intensity, whilst mortaring was given precedence in some areas.

10. Enemy terrorism and harassment will probably continue, as well as attempts to increase strength by infiltration and conscription. The enemy will continue to harass and conduct sabotage against airfields and logistic bases in all corps areas. The most likely areas for large scale attacks are in Northern I Corps (Quang Tri Province), in II Corps (Western Pleiku, Binh Dinh, and Phu Yen Provinces), and in Binh Long, Phuoc Long, and Tay Ninh Provinces in III Corps area.

(5) Friendly Force Activity

11. The most significant operations of the week were in II Corps area where some moderate to heavy engagements were made with the enemy in Pleiku Province. Elsewhere, only sporadic contacts were made with VC/NVA forces.

12. The following US/FW Search and Destroy operations either continued through, or were terminated, or were initiated during the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Macon</td>
<td>Quang Nam</td>
<td>9th USMC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prairie</td>
<td>Quang Tri</td>
<td>4th USMC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colorado</td>
<td>Quang Tin</td>
<td>5th USMC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suswance</td>
<td>Quang Nam</td>
<td>9th USMC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ottawa</td>
<td>Thua Thien</td>
<td>4th USMC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allegheny</td>
<td>Quang Nam</td>
<td>3rd USMC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paul Revere II</td>
<td>Pleiku</td>
<td>1st Air Cav</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Paul Jones II</td>
<td>Phu Yen</td>
<td>101st Abn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benning IV</td>
<td>Binh Dinh</td>
<td>1st Air Cav</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Su Bok</td>
<td>Binh Dinh</td>
<td>ROK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Do III</td>
<td>Binh Dinh</td>
<td>ROK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bun Kae 66-9</td>
<td>Pleiku</td>
<td>ROK</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
13. Friendly casualties were light to moderate during the period under review. In comparison, enemy losses were again heavy and showed an increase of some 250 killed over the previous reporting period. Final (F) and cumulative (C) losses by enemy forces are enumerated below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>(C)</th>
<th>(F)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mason</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>KIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prairie</td>
<td>307</td>
<td>KIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colorado</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>KIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suwanee</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>KIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ottawa</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>KIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allegheny</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>KIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lion Jet 52</td>
<td>504</td>
<td>KIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can Sa Quan Bi</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>KIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paul Revere 11</td>
<td>721</td>
<td>KIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Paul Jones</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>KIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benning 17</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>KIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Su Be</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>KIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bun Kae 66-3</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>KIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ben Chi 294</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>KIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ben Chi 471</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>KIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dan Long 37</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>KIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dan Chi 225</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>KIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dan Long 81</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>KIA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

14. The following is a transcription of an extract taken from a notebook belonging to an unidentified 70 Senior Sergeant Platoon Leader recovered in Quang Tri Province:

"Living in the jungle became exceedingly and terribly rough. At first, three balls of pressed rice with salt and a canton of water were given every day. Now, at each meal, only one ball of rice mixed with salt and a little fresh water are served. However, it is better than to eat moss as a rice substitute, taste ashes of straw as a substitute for salt, and to drink urine instead of water. The situation is becoming worse. Due to lack of food, sleep and worries, I feel too weak. My beloved Khanh and Yen, if your father remains eternally in this jungle of Quang Tri, try to live and study as good boys."

15. Experienced pilots from aircraft of the US 7th Fleet believe that North Vietnam is throwing up a flak barrage along its coastline heavier than any anti-aircraft barrier during World War II or the Korean War. They say that the barrage has been intensified in recent weeks and add that it is beginning to prove "very effective."

16. Testifying in secret before the Senate Appropriation Committee on 1st of August, Defence Secretary Robert S. McNamara estimated that the US would lose 500 attack aircraft during the current fiscal year in the Vietnam air war. These aircraft are worth about $2 million each so in round figures aircraft losses could cost about $1.2 billion.

17. The week ending August 7th tended to bear out McNamara's prediction that heavier losses will occur when 15 US planes were shot down in the largest one-week's toll of the war. This brought the announced total of north of the border air losses to 337.
(D) Political

18. President Johnson, after a week-end round of talks with General Westmoreland, said on Sunday 14th August that a Communist takeover of South Vietnam is "impossible", as long as US forces and their Allies are in the field.

19. The single most important factor now is our desire to prosecute the war until the Communists, recognizing the futility of their ambitions, either end the fighting or seek a peaceful settlement - said the President.

20. No one can say when this will be, or how many men will be needed, or how long we must persevere. The American people must know that there will be no quick victory, but the world must know that we will not quit, he concluded.

21. Meanwhile, the US 25th Division has become the largest US combat force in Vietnam, when 4,000 troops of the 196th Light Infantry Brigade arrived in-country on the 14th August. The 196th has set up its headquarters in Tay Ninh Province, some 40 miles northwest of Cu Chi, the home of the 25th Division. Forward elements of the US 4th Division have also arrived at Qui Nhon in II Corps.
Section 1  Discussion Point

1. The following is the "Conclusion" section of a lengthy MAC-V document entitled "Research and Analysis Study of the NVA Soldier".

2. A major strength of the NVA soldier remains political indoctrination. Although the pressures of war have reduced formal training, the North Vietnamese, already ideologically indoctrinated when he enters the Army, is subject both before and after infiltration to continuous "education" in his mission - the liberation of the South from imperialism.

3. A second major source of NVA strength is the excellent quality of its professional cadre. NVA cadre are elite Communists, highly dedicated and motivated. Their training is given absolute priority. Soldiers have great respect for and fear of their cadre, and most reports agree that cadre morale and dedication shows no signs of slackening under conditions which greatly distress the common soldier.

4. Training of the typical NVA soldier is not the source of strength it was before the 1965 build-up. While those soldiers and cadre who were trained in North Vietnam before 1965 are thoroughly prepared for a variety of battlefield conditions and missions, recent infiltrators have been hurried through shortened and less comprehensive basic courses which leave much to be desired. Some lack basic training in their assigned weapons, and few have confidence that they are adequately prepared for their tasks. If infiltration continues at its present pace, lack of training will handicap an increasing proportion of NVA soldiers.

5. From the standpoint of weapons and equipment NVA units are the strongest that Allied Forces face. They are equipped with the modern "new family" of Chi Com weapons. Standardisation lessens maintenance and replacement problems. Still, NVA weapons and equipment do not match those of Allied Forces, particularly in transport capability and in items of personal equipment. This is not wholly a vulnerability, however, since weight and vehicles hamper movement through jungle and forest. The NVA soldier strikes middle ground between the heavy firepower but limited ground mobility of Allied Forces, and the extreme mobility but light sustaining power of the VC.

6. Exhaustion, hunger, and disease reduce the combat effectiveness of the NVA soldier. Food, medicines, medical personnel and facilities, vitamins, shelter, rest and recreation is lacking. Increasing night harassment of NVA units and destruction of food supplies and supply lines through Allied bombing, herbicide, and ground operations suggest that deterioration of physical health will become an increasingly critical vulnerability.

6. Declining morale is another weakness in NVA overall capabilities. The hardships of infiltration and of life in the highlands, disillusionment over finding propaganda claims at variance with reality, and long absence from home and village all contribute to low and falling NVA morale. Low morale does not necessarily result, however, in low combat effectiveness. In the first place, most NVA soldiers appear to see no option but to go on fighting. They believe that their defection would preclude their ever returning to their families and that it could bring reprisals upon their families. Secondly, NVA cadre and the criticisms and self-criticism sessions serve to rally troops to impressive efforts. Thirdly, at the moment of battle, survival itself becomes the paramount objective. Collectively, this produces supreme efforts to avoid death or capture (which, due to NVA propaganda, the soldier equates with torture and execution). While high morale is deemed the best spur to high combat effectiveness; fear - of cadre, the enemy, and public exposure of one's inadequacies - is an effective substitute.

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7. The social characteristics of the typical NVA soldier reflect a mixture of potential strengths and vulnerabilities. Assets are the soldier’s youth, relatively high educational levels, and freedom from concern over wives and children. Vulnerabilities are his relative lack of military experience, origin in the lowland provinces of North Vietnam where life is not so hard as it is in the highlands, and high proportion of draftees compared to enlistees.

8. Our knowledge of the NVA soldier is still far from complete. Analysts are handicapped by a continuing tendency of reporting units and agencies not to distinguish NVA enemy from indigenous VC enemy. All indications are that infiltration of NVA soldiers is continuing at an increasing rate, and the NVA regiments already comprise an impressive segment of the military opposition to a free and democratic South Vietnam; their relative influence can be expected to grow steadily in the future. Knowledge of the enemy’s strengths and vulnerabilities is essential to Allied effectiveness in combat, and to this end, new information and intelligence on the NVA soldier will be continually developed.
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HQ 1 ATP - NUI DAT

TROOPS INFORMATION SHEET

No 6

Period: 22nd - 28th August 1966

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(C.D. Jackson)
Brigadier
Commander 1 ATP

OFFICIAL

JOHN S ROWE
Major
S2

Distribution: List B, plus two per Platoon/Troop Commander
List D, plus two copies to RAAF IO
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Section 1

III Corps Area

(A) Enemy Force Activity

1. The largest enemy force contacted during the reporting period was the VC Phu Loi Battalion, re-inforced by the VC 062 Company. Four additional contacts involved enemy forces from platoon size to one contact with two companies. Other enemy actions consisted of small scale attacks, ambushes, and harassment by forces of less than platoon size.

2. On the 25th of August, elements of the US 1st Infantry Division engaged the Phu Loi Battalion (re-inforced) in the vicinity of XT 845405, near Lei Khe. A stay behind patrol made the initial contact but was quickly re-inforced by four battalions. The Phu Loi Battalion occupied a maze of well prepared positions and put up a determined fight to prevent complete encirclement and keep open avenues of withdrawal. Captives stated that the Phu Loi Battalion was surprised by the 1st Division attack. It is deemed significant that the enemy risked occupying a base near and between two Brigade bases of the 1st Infantry Division at Lei Khe and Phuoc Vinh. The fighting, often heavy contact, lasted from 0725 to 2112 hours. The Phu Loi Battalion evidenced a plentiful supply of weapons and ammunition. The VC sustained 102 KIA and 6 WIA during this action.

(B) Friendly Force Activity

3. The most significant US/FW operation during the reporting period has been "Toledo", conducted by elements of the US 173rd Airborne Brigade, US Marines, US 1st Division, and ARVN Rangers in Phuoc Tuy Province. 5 RM, in operation Darlington, provided a blocking force and sweeps through the southern portion of the AO, including Long Tan village. Toledo was supported by airstrikes and gunfire from destroyers USS Osburn and Mullinix. Few contacts were made with enemy forces; however, the operation was successful in discovering a number of Base and Battalion size camps and capturing large quantities of weapons, ammunition, documents, and miscellaneous items of equipment.

4. During the period the following US/FW operations either continued through, or were terminated, or were initiated in the III Corps area:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Province</th>
<th>US/FW Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>El Paso III</td>
<td>Binh Long</td>
<td>US 1st Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lao Son II</td>
<td>Binh Duc</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anarillo</td>
<td>Binh Duc</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Castine</td>
<td>Binh Duc</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cau So</td>
<td>Tay Minh</td>
<td>US 25th Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lai Khe</td>
<td>Hau Nghia</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atea</td>
<td>Hau Nghia</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toledo</td>
<td>Phuoc Tuy</td>
<td>173rd/1st Div/ARVN/US Marines/ARVN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Darlington</td>
<td>Phuoc Tuy</td>
<td>1 APP</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The above were supplemented by some 26 ARVN operations during the period, the majority of which were of one to two day duration only.

5. Cumulative (C) and final (F) losses incurred by the enemy are listed hereunder:

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Section 2 South Vietnam (axol III Corps) & North Vietnam

(A) Enemy Force Activity

6. Generally, the VC persisted with a high level of small scale attacks of terrorism, harassment, sabotage, mortaring, and ambushes throughout the remainder of South Vietnam. However, a significant incident occurred on the 24th of August when an estimated VC battalion attacked the 953rd RN Company near the provincial capital (via An 600120) in Thua Thien Province, causing friendly losses of 59 KIA and 22 WIA - the enemy lost 11 KIA.

7. Enemy terrorism and harassment will probably continue, as will attempts to increase strength by infiltration and conscription. The enemy will probably attempt to disrupt the forthcoming GVN elections, and will probably continue to harass and conduct sabotage against airfields and logistic bases in all corps areas. The most likely areas for large scale attacks are in Northern I Corps (Quang Tri Province), in II Corps (Western Pleiku, Binh Dinh and Phu Yen Provinces), and in III Corps (Binh Duong and Phuoc Tay Provinces).

8. VC Underwater Demolition Techniques. A VC swimmer was captured near a dredge in Dong Tam, Dinh Tuong Province on the 14th of August. During subsequent interrogation it was learned that the prisoner, along with five accomplices, had placed a mine on the dredge and another on a clamsHELL barge. Both mines were the same detonation type and were recovered by security forces. MACV Comment. Several reports have been received which indicate that the VC have been training personnel in underwater demolition techniques. Other reports have indicated that the VC intend to use these techniques against friendly shipping. Recently, a US sailor reported what he believed to be bubbles from a swimmer using scuba gear near his ship. The above report, however, is the first communication that the VC are using swimmers to place demolitions.

9. Viet Cong Rice Problems. In Hau Ngia Province, a VC directive (dated 19th May, 1966), from the Current Affairs Committee of Saigon Gia Dinh Regional Committee, reveals difficulties encountered by the VC in purchasing, maintaining and storing rice.

10. The document stated that intensified and sustained Allied operations conducted during the rice harvest disrupted VC efforts to buy and properly store rice. Agencies and military units located in the area have been ordered to draw rice from villages to feed their personnel for the remainder of the year. The document stressed that the purchase of paddy is essential and must be continued depending on the availability of storage facilities. As a result of friendly operations, the following countermeasures were issued in the directive - rice stored in lowland caches would be removed during June and moved to the district quartermaster section - rice which could not be removed would be effectively maintained and protected from the weather. Additionally, the directive stated that rice was to be moved into RVN controlled areas and entrusted to the people for storage.
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11. This document confirms previous reports that the VC are experiencing a rice shortage in areas of III Corps. It re-inforces the VC practice of depending on the civilian populace for support and indicated that rice is not being properly stored and spoilage is creating additional shortages.

(B) Friendly Force Activities

12. In the main, only sporadic contact was made with the enemy during operations conducted by friendly elements throughout the remainder of South Vietnam - as a result the number of enemy killed during the period under review decreased by some 800 over the previous week. The following US/ FW operations either continued through, or were terminated, or were initiated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>CTZ</th>
<th>Province</th>
<th>US/FW Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Allegheny</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>Guang Nam</td>
<td>3rd US Marine Regt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prairie</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>Guang Tri</td>
<td>4th US Marine Regt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macon</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>Guang Nam</td>
<td>9th US Marine Regt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colorado</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>Quang Tri</td>
<td>5th US Marine Regt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ottawa</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>Than Thien</td>
<td>4th US Marine Regt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passee</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>Quang Ngai</td>
<td>7th US Marine Regt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jackson</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>Quang Ngai</td>
<td>7th US Marine Regt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polostar</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>Pleiku</td>
<td>2nd ROK Marine Bde</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paul Revere II</td>
<td>II</td>
<td>Pleiku</td>
<td>1st US Air Cav</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paul Revere III</td>
<td>II</td>
<td>Pleiku</td>
<td>1st US Air Cav/25th US Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Paul Jones II</td>
<td>II</td>
<td>Phu Yen</td>
<td>101st Abn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benning IV</td>
<td>II</td>
<td>Binh Dinh</td>
<td>1st US Air Cav</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Byrd</td>
<td>II</td>
<td>Binh Thuan/Lam Dong</td>
<td>1st US Air Cav</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Do III</td>
<td>II</td>
<td>Binh Dinh</td>
<td>60K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Su Bok</td>
<td>II</td>
<td>Binh Dinh</td>
<td>60K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bun Kae 66-9</td>
<td>II</td>
<td>Pleiku</td>
<td>60K</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The above operations were supplemented by 63 ARVN operations active during the period - 17 in I Corps, 13 in II Corps and 33 in IV Corps. The majority of these, however, were of one to two day duration only.

13. Friendly casualties were light during the reporting period - final (F) and cumulative (C) figures for enemy losses are listed as below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>CTZ</th>
<th>Losses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Allegheny</td>
<td></td>
<td>(C) 108 KIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prairie</td>
<td></td>
<td>(C) 214 KIA, 3 VCC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macon</td>
<td></td>
<td>(C) 270 KIA, 1 VCC, 31 VGS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colorado</td>
<td></td>
<td>(F) 170 KIA, 13 VCC, 16 VGS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ottawa</td>
<td></td>
<td>(F) 2 KIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passee</td>
<td></td>
<td>(F) Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jackson</td>
<td></td>
<td>(C) 2 KIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polostar</td>
<td></td>
<td>(C) 1 KIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hoa Tuyen 147</td>
<td></td>
<td>(F) 4 KIA, 53 VCC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paul Revere II</td>
<td></td>
<td>(F) 609 KIA, 104 VCC, 237 VGS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paul Revere III</td>
<td></td>
<td>(C) 2 KIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Paul Jones II</td>
<td></td>
<td>(C) 208 KIA, 32 VGS, 237 VGS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benning IV</td>
<td></td>
<td>(C) Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Byrd</td>
<td></td>
<td>(C) 1 KIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Do III</td>
<td></td>
<td>(C) Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Su Bok</td>
<td></td>
<td>(C) 293 KIA, 30 VCC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bun Kae 66-9</td>
<td></td>
<td>(F) 32 KIA, 100 KPA, 7 VCC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long Phi 984</td>
<td></td>
<td>(F) 34 KIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cau Long 84</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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14. When the 1954 Geneva Conference divided Viet Nam in two, it established a demilitarized buffer zone between the Communist North and the anti-Communist South. The zone is six miles wide and roughly follows the 17th parallel from the mountainous Lao Cai border in the West through thickly jungled foothills to the fertile paddies along the coast. For twelve years it was the quietest place in all of Viet Nam.

15. During the first week in August the peace was broken – on four separate days, American warplanes bombed the demilitarized zone. The antiaircraft barrage that greeted them did not come from Communist carbines and pistols. The whole western section of the DMZ was alive with North Vietnamese troops, elements of Ho Chi Minh’s ill-fated 324th Division, which had been driven out of South Vietnam during July by US Marine's Operation Hastings. Intelligence reports indicated that the 324th Division was no stranger to the area; rather than risk running the gauntlet of air reconnaissance and allied strongpoints along the Ho Chi Minh trail, the Division had actually infiltrated into South Vietnam two months ago, moving straight across the forbidden DMZ.

16. Communist protests against the bombing were significantly muffled. Even North Vietnam contended itself with accusing the US of "trampling underfoot," the Geneva Accords. But Canada, which, together with India and Poland, is charged with maintaining the International Control Commission that supposedly keeps Vietnam at peace, immediately pressed for an investigation and steps to clear the DMZ of all military activity.

17. In Washington, Secretary of State Dean Rusk backed the Canadians all the way. "We would be glad to see the ICC move to clear the demilitarized zone of all military action," he told a press conference. Although Rusk did not deny that the bombing could be considered further escalation of the war, he pointed out to reporters that it was the North Vietnamese government that had originally militarized the zone by sending in troops. 'The chronology of escalation is based on the fact that they keep coming," he said. "What we would prefer is that they send some negotiators in striped pants, not people in uniform'.

18. The bombing of the DMZ marked an anniversary of sorts – two years ago this month the US launched its aerial punishment of the Communist North with retaliatory raids against Communist PT-boat installations in the Gulf of Tonkin. Six months later it became a daily routine and now the American campaign from the skies is running some 670 sorties per day over both North and South Vietnam.

(D) Political

19. There are growing indications in the Republic of Vietnam that the VC intends to make a major effort to sabotage the forthcoming constituent assembly elections. With the September 17th voting only two weeks off, reports are increasing of VC threats against candidates and individual voters.

20. Leaflets attacking the elections have begun to appear in Saigon and other cities. Hanoi radio is stepping up its propaganda, and the Communist underground organisation is quietly threatening candidates. In some isolated areas guerrillas have begun to take away villagers identification cards, which would prevent them from voting.

21. The question is, how many of the 5 million eligible voters will the Communist tactics frighten away. The US Embassy will not make an official guess as to how many voters might turn out and diplomatic sources fear that a sustained communist effort could significantly lower the number.

22. It is generally felt by Diplomats and other qualified sources that the government of Premier Nguyen Cao Ky needs a turnout of at least 3 million voters to claim a success.
Section 3 Discussion Point

1. **The Air War - Less Than a Success.** The great majority of military experts agree that the use of airstrikes in direct support of Allied soldiers in South Vietnam deserves chief credit for making the war militarily winnable. And it seems equally clear that close air support has played an important role in boosting the fighting spirit of American ground troops.

2. But the Air Force does not confine its efforts in South Vietnam to close-support operations. And it is precisely over its other operations - specifically, "spoil the VC" operations directly against suspected Viet Cong concentrations and attacks against contesting villages - that the greatest debate among military experts has occurred. While raids by heavy B-52 bombers from Guam against known VC sanctuaries, such as the Iron Triangle and War Zones "C" and "D" near Saigon, are theoretically defensible on military grounds, they have, so far at least, produced relatively meager results. And the so-called "contested" villages, which are liable to air strikes at a moment's notice, contain 20 percent of South Vietnam's peasantry.

3. Furthermore, despite the Air Force's claim that its tactical operations are "well controlled" in military history, the fact remains that the decision whether or not to bomb a village suspected of harboring VC is often made by the local Vietnamese province chief. And he, in turn, depends for his information on intelligence agents whose reports he seldom bothers to verify. "Province Chiefs", says a young US Air Force officer, "have the right of life or death over villagers and many seem to think that peasants are expendable. Instead of sending a company of provincial guards to check on an agent's report, some province chiefs will ask their US Adviser to send in an air strike. Air strikes have been sent on villages which were late in paying their land tax."

4. The same moral problem raised by the death of civilians as a result of air operations in South Vietnam applies, of course, in the case of US air strikes against North Vietnam. But more often, when it comes to the air war across the 17th parallel, the debate between military analysts has focused on the question of strategic effectiveness.

5. Despite mounting plane losses in recent weeks - and a total loss of 342 aircraft over the north in the last nineteen months - almost all US officers in Vietnam believe that the raids are worth the cost. One top US commander flatly states; "The North Vietnamese Army has 50 percent fewer supplies in the south than it planned on because of bombings". And Air Force strategists are convinced that this is one of the chief reasons why the Communists have failed to launch their expected monsoon offensive this year.

6. However, assertions about what the North Vietnamese might have done had there been no bombings are, at the least, educated guesswork. Critics, moreover, argue that, even judged by stated purposes, the bombings have been something less than a notable success. Those purposes were to stem the rate of infiltration from the north and to convince Hanoi that it was in its own best interest to reach a negotiated settlement. Yet today, there are 50,000 more North Vietnamese troops in the south than there were six months ago, and Hanoi seems as far away from the peace table as ever.

7. Nonetheless, planners argue that the relentless pounding of North Vietnam's lines of communications and petroleum storage facilities cannot but have a devastating cumulative effect. This view is supported by Air Marshal Sir John Sleator, former Chief of Britain's Air Staff; "If we are thinking in terms of the long haul", says Sir John, "intensified bombing must ultimately totally disrupt the North Vietnamese economy and bring a leadership even as fanatical as theirs to its senses."
8. Yet other close students of air power hold the opposite belief -
and to prove their point they cite the experience of the Korean War. Al-
though Operation Strangle, the ten-month-long air interdiction campaign
waged by the U.N. in Korea, ultimately succeeded in halting perhaps 95 per-
cent of North Korea's rail traffic, at the end of the war a Communist army
of a million men was still receiving adequate supplies on the backs of
coolies. What Operation Strangle demonstrated, according to one school
of thought, is that air interdiction can be truly effective only when it is
accompanied by an all-out ground offensive against the enemy - a possibility
that will not exist in Vietnam so long as the Administration declines to
conduct ground operations in the North.

9. Many eminent strategic thinkers - who otherwise support US policy
in Vietnam - believe that the bombing campaign against the north can be
faulted on two important scores: it displays, they say, both a profound
disregard for basic military doctrine and a faulty estimation of the enemy's
psychological strength. "You cannot hit the North Vietnamese cities the
way the Allies hit Hamburg during World War II", declares Conrad Ahlert, a
West German military expert. "First of all, as long as North Vietnam is
not blockaded, but is able to resupply what has been damaged by air raids,
the raids lose their effectiveness. Second, the North Vietnamese seem to
be able to remove and replace all that has been threatened with damage or
hit by bombs". A senior French officer who fought in Indo-China says,
"we know these (North Vietnamese). They have been fighting for over twenty
years and they may be capable of fighting for another twenty".

10. Washington, of course, doesn't expect that it will have to carry
on the war that long. According to Secretary of Defence Robert S. McNamara,
the interdiction of North Vietnam's supply routes has placed a "ceiling" on
the number of troops that Hanoi can support in the south as well as on the
rates at which they can be reinforced. Thus, declares McNamara, it is only
a matter of time before US ground forces destroy the enemy's main-force
units and bring the war to a successful conclusion. By the same logic, it
is also only a matter of time before McNamara - and the decision to start
bombing the north - is proved right or wrong. (Newsweek, August 29th, 1966).

Tailpiece

11. Secretary of Defence, Robert S. McNamara tells friends that
when a man is bald in the front it indicates that he's a thinker. When
he's bald in back, it indicates he's sexy. And when the baldness in
back meets the baldness in front, it's just a man who thinks he's sexy.
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TROOPS INFORMATION SHEET

No. 7

Period: 29th Aug - 4th Sept '66

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(O.D. Jackson)
Brigadier
Commander 1 ATF

OFFICIAL

W. A. PIPER
Major
S2

Distribution: List B, Plus two per Platoon/Troop Commander

List D

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Section 1

III Corps Area

(A) Enemy Force Activity

1. There were no significant contacts with VC units in III Corps during the reporting period. Enemy activity consisted mainly of sporadic small scale attacks, ambushes and harassing. Enemy initiated incidents continued to be most numerous in Binh Duong Province, but the incident rate has increased in all provinces, as evidenced by 141 incidents this week, as compared to 87 for the previous period.

2. This increased activity reflects the Viet Cong's intention to undermine and disrupt the 11th September election at all cost. In the GVN (Saigon area), of 33 incidents of terrorism which occurred last month, 25 of these occurred in the last two weeks of August.

3. A Top Secret directive of the Saigon-Cholon-Gia Dinh Special Sector Committee, containing COSVN instructions to the VC to destroy the elections, was captured on the 29th of August by the US 25th Division. The plan coincides with information received from all four Corps Zones. An exception is a called for cessation of anti-election activity after 0600 on election day. Other reports have stressed continued terrorism throughout election day and during post election period.

4. The VC propaganda continues to attack the elections. And terrorist incidents have increased substantially for the second week and can be expected to increase further. Additionally, the VC are attempting to incite the Buddhists to continue "Struggle" demonstrations, but it appears that Buddhist opposition will remain in the boycott-propaganda sphere.

(B) Friendly Force Activity

5. Of the US/FW operations conducted in III Corps area during the period under review, "Tolodo" continued without change in task, but the area of operations shifted to the west in Phuoc Tuy Province, between Route 2 and Highway 15. Few contacts were made with enemy forces, and of those made, elements of 1ATF were responsible for 2 VC KIA and 2 WIA. However, several more base camps were found and destroyed, whilst large quantities of arms, ammunition and equipment were recovered.

6. The VC continued to evade major friendly operations throughout the GVN and as a result losses on both sides were relatively light. VC losses for the week as a result of US and FMF/ATF actions in III Corps were 90 KIA, 185 WIA (posse) and 53 captives. The following US/FW operations either continued, or were initiated, or were terminated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Province</th>
<th>US/FW Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amarillo</td>
<td>Binh Duong</td>
<td>US 1st Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Paso III</td>
<td>Binh Long</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lam Son II</td>
<td>Binh Duong</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baton Rouge</td>
<td>Bien Hoa/Tong Sat S2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decatur</td>
<td>Binh Long</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cremetson</td>
<td>Binh Duong</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canh</td>
<td>Tay Ninh</td>
<td>US 25th Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luhaina</td>
<td>Han Nghia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agra</td>
<td>Han Nghia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kippe</td>
<td>Binh Duong</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunset Beach</td>
<td>Han Nghia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tolodo</td>
<td>Phuoc Tuy</td>
<td>US 173rd Abn/US 1st Div/1ATF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue Jay</td>
<td>Tay Ninh</td>
<td>US 196th Infantry Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alice</td>
<td>Tay Ninh</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Darlington</td>
<td>Phuoc Tuy</td>
<td>1ATF</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: These operations were supplemented by some 30 ARVN operations active during the period.
8. There were no large scale VC initiated attacks directed against friendly forces throughout the remainder of South Vietnam during the reporting period. However, small scale incidents continued on an upward trend, with a large proportion of VC plans designed to intimidate voters and thereby disrupt the coming elections.

9. VC Anti-Election Tactics. In Long An and Vinh Long Provinces new VC tactics, designed to sabotage the coming elections, have recently been uncovered. The VC are making holes in trees, placing a grenade with the pin removed, inside the hole, and then placing an anti-government poster over the hole. The safety lever is taped to the rear of the poster and when a loyal GVN individual attempts to tear down the poster, the grenade explodes. This is but one of the devious schemes employed by the VC to dissuade the local populace from voting at the coming elections.

10. Enemy terrorism and harassment will probably continue, as will attempts to increase strength by infiltration and conscription. The enemy will probably attempt to disrupt the forthcoming GVN elections and will probably continue to harass and conduct sabotage against airfields and logistic bases in all areas. The most likely areas for large scale attacks are in Northern I Corps (Quang Tri Province), in II Corps (Western Pleiku, Binh Dinh, and Phu Yen Provinces), and in III Corps (Binh Duong, Phuoc Tuy, and Tay Minh Provinces).

11. US/FW operations conducted during the period made only sporadic contact with VC/VA forces and subsequently the number of enemy killed decreased from 1145 (adjusted figure) to 885. Allied casualties were light. The following US/FW operations either continued, or were initiated, or were terminated during the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>OTZ</th>
<th>Province</th>
<th>US/FW Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Allegheny</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>Quang Nam</td>
<td>USMC 3rd Regiment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jackson</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>Quang Ngai</td>
<td>USMC 7th Regiment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prairie</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>Quang Tri</td>
<td>USMC 4th Regiment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macon</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>Quang Nga</td>
<td>USMC 9th Regiment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pasco</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>Thua Thien</td>
<td>USMC 4th Regiment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troy</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>Quang Nga</td>
<td>USMC 1st Regiment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pueblo</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>Quang Nga</td>
<td>ROK 2nd Marine Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paul Revere III</td>
<td>II</td>
<td>Pho Ki</td>
<td>1st Air Cav/25th Div/4th Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Paul Jones</td>
<td>II</td>
<td>Phu Yon</td>
<td>101st Abn/1st Air Cav/4th Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benning IV</td>
<td>II</td>
<td>Binh Dinh</td>
<td>1st Air Cav</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benning V</td>
<td>II</td>
<td>Binh Dinh</td>
<td>1st Air Cav</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ryndo</td>
<td>II</td>
<td>Binh Thuan</td>
<td>ROK CAP Inf Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Do III</td>
<td>II</td>
<td>Binh Dinh</td>
<td>ROK CAP Inf Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Su Bok</td>
<td>II</td>
<td>Binh Dinh</td>
<td>ROK CAP Inf Div</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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12. Cumulative (C) and final (F) losses sustained by the enemy are enumerated below:

- **Allegheny** (F) 113 KIA
- **Jackson** (F) 3 KIA, 10 WIA
- **Troy** (F) 1 KIA
- **Prairie** (C) Little change
- **Marston** (C) 374 KIA, 2 WIA
- **Founce** (C) Little change
- **Folstar** (C) Unknown
- **Paul Revere III** (C) 14 KIA, 2 WIA
- **John Paul Jones** (C) 232 KIA, 35 WIA
- **Baner IV** (F) 5 KIA, 15 WIA
- **Baner V** (C) Unknown
- **Byrd** (C) 7 KIA
- **Ho Do III** (C) Unknown
- **Su Bok** (C) 303 KIA, 33 WIA, 122 WIA
- **Lan Son 309** (C121) (F) 72 KIA, 5 WIA
- **Lan Son 310** (C121) (F) 18 KIA
- **Chu Long 39** (C121) (F) 28 KIA, 2 WIA
- **Dan Chai 251** (C121) (F) 57 KIA, 2 WIA
- **Dan Chai 251 B** (C121) (C) 164 KIA, 9 WIA
- **Chu Long 23** (C121) (F) 32 KIA, 5 WIA

13. Possible VC/NVA Vulnerabilities to Pay Ops. An analysis of responses from the interrogation of 216 WIA revealed some possible VC/NVA vulnerabilities to US and GVN pay operations. This information assesses the morale during the period 1st May through 15th July, 1966, and deals primarily with morale and its casual factors. Of the VC Main Force personnel questioned, 22 per cent considered the morale good; 14 per cent as fair; and 64 per cent the morale as poor. The following factors, causing poor morale, were listed according to the frequency with which they were mentioned:

(a) Bombing by aircraft.
(b) Little training
(c) Poor quality of recruits
(d) Forced enlistment
(e) Hardships, such as disease, lack of food etc
(f) Artillery weapon bombardment
(g) Intensity of the war and the impact of US forces

14. Similar questions posed to 25 NVA troops, the majority of which were captives, revealed that 41 per cent rated the morale of their units as good, 36 per cent as fair, and 23 per cent rated morale as poor. These factors were mentioned as the cause of poor morale by the NVA:

(a) Sickness (especially malaria)
(b) Nausea
(c) Lack of food and bad food
(d) Fear of the bombings
(e) Poor recruits
(f) Carrying heavy loads for long distances

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The North Vietnamese spring harvest, normally accounting for more than one-third of the annual rice crop and more than three-quarters of the annual production of subsidiary crops, is well below normal. Although the NVN admit the spring agricultural season has been a poor one, available information does not permit a precise estimate of the extent. Contrary to past patterns, the NVN have not released any statistical information concerning these crops - a further indication that they have done poorly. The marginal showing has been caused by a number of factors, including unfavorable weather, shortages of fertilizers, shortages of manpower, disease, and insects. Undoubtedly airstrikes have also taken their toll.

North Vietnam recognizes that the ideological dispute has become open and public but does not lean toward either the USSR or Communist China. They regard the present dispute as an internal affair and the ultimate policy (to spread Communism throughout the world) has not been changed.

They see that the USSR made the following mistakes:

(a) Kruschev dogmatically made the decision to remove Stalin's body from Red Square; if Stalin had committed any crimes he had borne little guilt because he had achieved a great deal. Therefore this should have been done as a result of the decision and with the agreement of most of the International Communist Parties.

(b) Negotiations for peace with the US concerning South Vietnam would be a mistake for the following reasons:

(i) the political solution to the problem of unifying SVN and NVN has been contested from 1956 to the present time without result.

(ii) Ngo Dinh Diem's government slaughtered the followers of the South Vietnam Liberation Front.

(iii) The US has sent more and more troops into SVN.

However, the NVN concept of the political solution has been preserved; if the military solution exists, it is only a support and assistance to the political solution.

The soldiers' (those attending the course) opinion inclined somewhat to the policy of Communist China; however, they felt unhappy about the dispute between the two "Elder Parties". They avoided thinking about the dissolving viewpoints within the Communist Bloc; therefore they tried to keep the viewpoint of considering the dispute as an internal affair which was not important.
SECTION 3

DISCUSSION POINT

1. Redoubt in the South. Of South Vietnam’s harried population of nearly 16 million, more than half live in the lush 11,000 square mile tangled mass of mangrove swamps, rice fields and canals that form the Mekong Delta. Here at the heart of Vietnam south of Saigon, is the richest granary on the Indochinese Peninsula; rice from its loamy soil once fed most of what is now Laos, Cambodia and the two Vietnams. When the 1954 Geneva Agreements cleared Indochina into those four pieces, the delta was South Vietnam’s greatest prize - and the Communists have never forgotten it. For more than twenty years, hordes of Viet Cong and Viet Minh before them have lodged deep in the forest that sprawl much of the delta, extracting vast treasure in food, tax money and recruits from the surrounding peasantry.

2. So far (except for a scattering of Special Forces camps that dot the Cambodian border), this critical war zone has remained untouched by US combat forces. The delta, in fact, has remained the preserve of the South Vietnamese IV Corps, commanded by Lt. Gen. Dang Van Cuong who just a year ago was saying “I do not see any big problem from a military point of view. We are doing very well right now.” But the Viet Cong have been doing quite well in the delta, too, in contrast to their showing in Cambodia. Initially, although they continue to lose men at the rate of 1000 killed per month, they have built up their strength from 33,000 last year to a full 70,000. And the fifteen new battalions that the Viet Cong manage to recruit in South Vietnam each month come mainly from the delta, one high-ranking US officer reports.

3. The delta’s roads which sprout Viet Cong checkpoints and mines at unpredictable intervals, have become increasingly perilous for all but local villagers - and even they move safely only at the pleasure of the rebel command. In Sa Xuyen Province, for example, the Viet Cong recently decreed that all roads into the provincial capital would be closed for three days to observe Ho Chi Minh’s birthday, and, despite the best efforts of government patrols to prevent it, the populace obeyed.

4. The Saigon government, in a rush effort to win the loyalty of the delta’s peasantry, has built new schools by the hundreds - but almost as quickly the Viet Cong tear them down again. In one province, more than 50 schools were constructed and 47 of them promptly demolished; even those that survive often languish for lack of teachers and books. The US AID program has spent some $3 million on schoolbooks for the country, but most of them are rotting in storage because there is no transportation to move them.

5. Most serious of all, rice production has suffered drastically as terrified peasants move off their land. This year, one third of the tillable rice land in the delta will not be planted, and the crop is expected to drop from the former average of 5 million metric tons to a mere 3 million. What’s more, much of this disappointing harvest will never reach market; large quantities are seized by the Viet Cong or smuggled into Cambodia to fetch a higher price.

6. Last week it seemed increasingly clear that US troops would eventually have to take a hand in the grubby murderous task of trying to pry the rebels loose from their redoubts in the delta. There are major hurdles to be surmounted first - principally the lack of a secure logistical base in the area - so it is likely that initial US operations will be confined to raids into Viet Cong coastal strongholds and patrols along the delta’s 2,500 miles of inland waterway. But many observers reckon - and captured documents bear them out - that the steady Viet Cong buildup in the delta is designed to put eventual pressure on Saigon itself, which lies some 30 miles from the northernmost delta province. No one will be much surprised if, before the year is out US troops move overland in force down to the northern branches of the Mekong River to counter this mounting threat.

(Newsweek Aug 29, 1966)
CONTESTABLE

The following is taken from a consolidated interrogation report and provides a summary of responses of ten individual prisoners/returnees in regards to VC/NVA shortages in critical supplies, reasons for VC/NVA avoidance of large scale engagements with US/ARVN forces, and the morale of VC/NVA personnel and their enthusiasm for continuing the conflict.

Question 1 What have you heard of shortages among VC and North Vietnamese Armed Forces in RVN, of ammunition, medical supplies or food query.

(a) North Vietnamese Naval officers had not heard of any shortages. (BAO) stated that the VC had recently received new Hungarian sniper rifles.

(b) VC/NVA personnel captured or returned in RVN indicated a lack of food and medical supplies, however, there was no indication that the shortage was sufficient to seriously affect VC/NVA operational capabilities.

Question 2 What affect has air interdiction of infiltration routes had on the flow of ammunition and medical supplies into RVN query.

(a) North Vietnamese Naval officers indicated that air interdiction of infiltration routes had made the movement of supplies more difficult, but had not appreciably reduced the quantity of supplies moved. (BAO) stated that Brigadier General PHAN THONG TUB, Minister of Transportation and Communications, had organised youth groups which keep supply routes open using emergency bridging sections and road repair teams. He also stated that the use of vehicles to infiltrate supplies had increased 1000% and that engineer units engaged in road repair had increased by 500%.

(b) VC/NVA personnel captured or returned in RVN indicated that air interdiction had reduced the quantity of supplies brought into RVN, particularly food. Air strikes had increased the infiltration time by two months, according to one source. Movement of supplies by night avoided US air strikes.

Question 3 To what extent have VC/NVA forces lost their ammunition, medical supplies and food caches query.

(a) (BAO) was the only Naval officer who expressed an opinion. He stated that little was lost because the VC/NVA forces have few supplies on hand and that their losses can be made up by capturing supplies from US/ARVN units.

(b) (THUONG) was the only VC prisoner or returnee who made a positive statement in answer to this question. He stated that all supplies were brought from the North; nothing was stored in large quantities in RVN.

Question 4 Why would VC and North Vietnamese forces avoid large scale battles with US forces query.

(a) (BAO) was the only Naval officer who made a positive statement. He said that VC/NVA forces were building up their supplies for a large scale engagement.

(b) VC/NVA personnel captured or returned in RVN indicated that their tactics were to engage only units smaller or equal to their own in size and that they wanted to avoid air strikes.

Question 5 Do troops infiltrating RVN from NVN believe that they will survive the war query.

(a) Two Naval officers indicated that NVN personnel expected to survive the war, the others expressed no opinion.

(b) The VC/NVA personnel captured or returned in RVN indicated belief that the VC could not win the war and that they would not survive the war.
Question 6  Do VC/NVA troops feel like hunted animals facing certain death query.

(a) Two Naval officers voiced optimism about survival, the others expressed no opinion.

(b) VC/NVA personnel captured or returned in RVN avoided the term "hunted animals", but stated their belief that they would die in the South.

Question 7  How can the Americans induce wholesale surrender of VC/NVA forces query.

(a) (BAO) destroy COSVN (Central Office South Vietnam)

(b) (THUY) Convince VC/NVA troops that the North Vietnamese government has surrendered.

(c) (TRUONG) Assure that VC/NVA troops understand the Chieu Hoi Programme so that they will not be afraid to turn themselves in to the RVN government.

(d) (TRUONG) maintain military pressure on VC/NVA forces.

(e) (TRUONG) increase the anti-guerrilla effort as guerrillas make it very difficult for other VC and NVA personnel to turn themselves in.

(f) (SU) cut off the sources of VC/NVA supply.

(g) (NH) encircle VC/NVA units and appeal for surrender before attacking.

Question 8  When will the NVN Army and the War of Liberation query.

The general opinion was that the war would continue for a very long time.

Radio Hanoi Reports


The Australian mercenaries, who are no less husky and beefy than their allies, the US aggressors, have proved as good flesh targets for the South Vietnam Liberation Fighters. According to LPA (Liberation Press Agency), in two days ending 16th August, the LAF (Liberation Armed Forces) wiped out over 500 Australian mercenaries in Ba Ria Province.

9. LPA reported that on 16th August in the coastal province of Ba Ria, east of Saigon, the LAF wiped out almost completely, one battalion of Australian mercenaries in an ambush in Long Tan village. At 1500 hours that day, an Australian mercenary battalion and a column of armoured cars fell into an ambush. Within the first few minutes, the LAF fiercely attacked the enemy and made short work of two companies, set fire to three M-113 armoured cars, and drove the remnants into a corner of the battlefield. The LAF then concentrated their fire on them and heavily decimated the remaining company. The LAF also shot down one of the US aircraft that went to the help of the battered Australians.

10. According to first reports, in this battle the LAF put out of action 400 Australian mercenaries, thus annihilating two full-sized companies, heavily decimated another, set fire to three M-113 armoured cars, downed one US aircraft, and captured a great quantity of arms and ammunition. The day before, 17th August, the LAF, in the same province wiped out 100 Australian mercenaries.

11. For these victories, the South Vietnam LAF command has decided to award a Liberation Military Exploit Order (Third Class) to the victorious units.
Radio Peking Reports

12. 500 Australian Satellite Troops Wiped out in Ba Ria, 8th Vietnam. More than 500 Australian satellite troops, including two whole companies, were wiped out by the South Vietman Liberation Army in Ba Ria Province on 17 and 18 August when it launched fierce attacks on an Australian Battalion and an armoured car column, reported the South Vietnam Liberation Press agency.

13. In an attack on an Australian base in Nui Thu on 17th August, the Liberation Army in Ba Ria Province wiped out more than 100 Australian troops. In the afternoon of the following day, the Liberation Army knocked out a number of Australian troops which fell into an ambush in Long Tan hamlet. Then, the Liberation Forces concentrated their fire on the rest of the enemy and wiped out more than four hundred Australian Satellite troops. Two companies were completely wiped out and another company was heavily battered. Three M-113 armoured cars were destroyed.

14. The Command of the South Vietnam Liberation Armed Forces has recently decided to award this victorious unit with the Liberation Exploit Order, third class.
CIVIC ACTION REPORTS

Reference: 1 ATF R1764/1/1. Organisation and functions of Civil Affairs of 1 Jun 66.

1. Unit Civil Affairs representatives are to ensure that weekly reports reach the Staff Officer Civil Affairs by 1200 hrs each Saturday.

2. The reports submitted should be comprehensive enough for statistical details to be extracted for inclusion in reports required at HQ AFV and 11 FFV. Examples of the detail required are as follows.
   a. MEDCAP: conducted at Hoa Long school on 27 July; 36 persons were treated, 59 of whom were children. 16 were dependants of local RF soldiers. The medical officers' observations were that the children were suffering mainly from hookworm, malnutrition, ringworm and other skin complaints.
   b. Food Distribution: conducted at Hoa Long market place on 26 July. 3001bs in 51b bags were distributed to the elderly civilians attending the market. A district official, arranged by the Civil Affairs Section, was in attendance; and in fact did the distribution.

3. Anticipated requirements of stores and supplies with comments and recommendations should also be included if applicable in the weekly reports.

4. All Civil Action projects are to be co-ordinated through the Civil Affairs Section. This is necessary to ensure proper co-ordination with the local officials and their active participation in all projects. Everything that is done must be done with the aim of enhancing the SVN image in the eyes of the people.

5. Attached is a copy of the 1 ATF Civic Action report forwarded to 11 FFV. Copies of these reports to 11 FFV will be forwarded to unit CA representatives weekly.

Distribution

List A
Spare 20 (to CA Section)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>AREA/DISTRICT</th>
<th>UNITS INVOLVED</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>DATE or % COMPLETED</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Health and Sanitation</td>
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<td>5 RAR</td>
<td>20 Jul</td>
<td>Completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>MEDCAP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Community Relations</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Food Distribution</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Health and Sanitation</td>
<td>Hot Long</td>
<td>TF Arty</td>
<td>25, 27, 29 Jul</td>
<td>Completed</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>MEDCAP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Health and Sanitation</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>2 Pd And</td>
<td>28, 29 Jul</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Specialized Medical Aid</td>
<td></td>
<td>TF Arty</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 ATF CA Sec</td>
<td></td>
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<td>5.</td>
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<td>&quot;</td>
<td>103 Sig Sgn</td>
<td>22 Jul</td>
<td>Completed</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Education and Training</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>1 ATF CA Sec</td>
<td>3 Times a week</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>English Classes</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>7.</td>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>1 Pd Sec RAE</td>
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</tr>
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<td>8.</td>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>School Ground Clearing</td>
<td></td>
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</table>
Narrative Description of Projects

1. The MEDCAP at Duc My Hamlet was conducted immediately following a search operation. Numbers treated were not recorded but it was observed that many children were suffering from malnutrition.

2. The food distribution comprised 1700 lbs of rice in 5 lb bags and milk, sugar and 6 ration items collected from unit members. Some food items were especially collected from mess kitchens in the HQ 1 ATF area and flown into Duc My Hamlet.

3. The MEDCAPs at Hoa Long conducted by TF Arty and 2 Pd Amb treated 196 civilian personnel of whom 150 were children from one of the local schools. It is not known if any of those treated were ARVN dependents. Skin diseases appear to be the most common complaint.

4. Specialized medical treatment was given to two girls from the village (2 and 5 years). One was given head sutures by a medical officer and the other was taken to 36 MEDWAG at Vung Tau where an emergency operation was performed to repair a damaged eye.

5. 103 Sig Sqn distributed 1900 lbs of rice in 5 lb bags at the school at Hoa Long.

6. English classes are being conducted three times a week at the District HQ. An average of 20 civilians (mostly district officials) attend these classes and it appears the numbers will increase due to an appeal by the District Chief.

7. Approximately 1000 meters of arterial roads in Hoa Long were cleared, widened and partially graded by 1 Rd Sqn Engineers. This project will be completed and similar ones undertaken when Engineer plant can be released from operational and base area commitments.
8. The playground area of one of the local schools was cleared and increased in area by about 2400 sq metres by 1 Md Sgn Engineers; more work will be carried out at the school in the near future.

Evaluation of Program

It is not possible at this stage to give an evaluation of the civic action programs conducted to date by 1 ATF. There appears to be fear by some of the civilians to accept individual treatment. An example of this is where the parents of a child with a possible fractured foot refused specialized treatment because of fear of reprisals.

General Comments

Due to operational commitments and the establishing and development of the 1 ATF Base area it has not been possible to conduct an extensive Civic Action program. It is expected however that Civic Action projects will increase in the near future.

John F. Donohoe
Major
Staff Officer Civil Affairs
1 ATF
CIVIC ACTION REPORT 2/66

Find attached a copy for information of civic action report 2/66 forwarded to II FFV.

Distribution
List A
List D
Spares 20

(O.D. Jackson)
Brigadier
Commander 1 ATF
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>AREA/DISTRICT</th>
<th>UNITS INVOLVED</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>DATE or % COMPLETED</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Health and Sanitation</td>
<td>Hoa Long</td>
<td>TF Arty/2 Fd Amb/</td>
<td>1, 3, 4, 6 Aug</td>
<td>Continuous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MEDCAP</td>
<td></td>
<td>3 513 Sqn/1 ATP CA Sec.</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>2.</td>
<td>Health and Sanitation</td>
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<td>33 Dental Unit</td>
<td>4 Aug</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DENTCAP</td>
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<td>3.</td>
<td>Health and Sanitation</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 ATP CA Sec/</td>
<td>4 Aug</td>
<td>Completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Specialized medical aid</td>
<td></td>
<td>TF Arty</td>
<td></td>
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<td>4.</td>
<td>Community Relations</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Distribution of CARE</td>
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<td>4 Aug</td>
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<td>school kits.</td>
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<td>6.</td>
<td>Education and Training</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>English Classes</td>
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<td>3 X 1 hour classes</td>
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<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Commerce and Industry</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>Jobs for Vietnamese.</td>
<td></td>
<td>TF Arty</td>
<td>1 - 6 Aug</td>
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<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3 - Aug</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MEDEVAC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Narrative Description of Projects

1. The MEDCAPS at Hoa Long by Task Force Artillery, 2 Field Ambulance and 3 SAS SQN treated 347 civilian personnel of whom 241 were children. 120 of the children were treated at one of the Hoa Long schools and the main complaints treated were skin infections and upper respiratory tract infections. Of the remainder, 61 were treated by a QA section member at present permanently located in the village and this member has become reasonably popular with the villagers who do not hesitate to approach him for treatment of minor accidents and complaints.

2. The DENTCAP which was only of short duration was conducted at the Hoa Long school and five children were treated and 6 extractions were made. It appeared obvious that the only villagers who seek treatment are those in pain. Efforts will be made to make more dental inspections and to endeavour to give remedial treatment.

3. During a MEDCAP two children (11 and 13) were found to have shrapnel wounds and after special treatment were taken and admitted to the Baria hospital. The sum of 250 piastres was paid to provide food for several days.

4. 480 CARE school packs were distributed to the children at Hoa Long school on 3 Aug 66. The distribution was conducted jointly by Australian personnel and the District and Village Chiefs.

5. Repairs to one of the Hoa Long schools is progressing. To date all floors and steps have been repaired.

6. English classes being conducted have reached lesson 15 and revision work carried on. The average attendance dropped to 12 this week but the dropouts were local officials who were required on administrative duties.

7. Six local villagers were employed this week to work in conjunction with the TF Arty personnel on repairing the school. The wages paid was 3480 piastres.

8. The child who was admitted to 36 MEDEVAC at Vung Tau is still there and a civil affairs representative took the child's relations to visit her on 3 Aug 66. This entailed a cost of 100 piastres for a meal for the family.

Evaluation of Program

It is still not possible to give an evaluation of the civic action program but indications are that the people of Hoa Long village are not quite so openly hostile as they were in the initial stages of the 1 ATF presence in the area.
CIVIC ACTION REPORT 3/66

Find attached a copy for information of Civic Action report 3/66 forwarded to II PPV.

(0.D. Jackson)
Brigadier
Commander I ATP

Distribution
List A
List D
Spares 20
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>AREA/DISTRICT</th>
<th>UNITS INVOLVED</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>DATE OR % COMPLETED</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>1.</td>
<td>Health and Sanitation MEDCAP</td>
<td>Hoa Long</td>
<td>3 SAS Sqn</td>
<td>10 Aug</td>
<td>Continuous</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.</td>
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<td>Binh Ba</td>
<td>5 RAR</td>
<td>12 Aug</td>
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<td>4.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>33 Dental Unit</td>
<td>12 Aug</td>
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<td>5.</td>
<td>Health and Sanitation DENMEDCAP</td>
<td>Binh Gia</td>
<td></td>
<td>7 Aug - 13 Aug</td>
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<td>6.</td>
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<td>Hoa Long</td>
<td>2 Pd Amb</td>
<td>13 Aug</td>
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<td>7.</td>
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<td>10.</td>
<td>Community Relations Clothing Distribution</td>
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<td></td>
<td>13 Aug</td>
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11. **Community Relations**
   **Food Distribution**
   Binh Ba
   5 RAR/1 ATP CA Sec
   10 Aug
   Continuous

12. **Transportation**
    **MEDEVAC**
    Binh Gia/Binh Ba
    Hoa Long
    5 RAR/2 Fd Amb
    12 and 13 Aug

13. **Commerce and Industry**
    **Jobs for Vietnamese**
    Hoa Long
    1 ATP CA Sec
    All week

14. **Transportation**
    **Perry Service**
    Hoa Long/Binh Gia
    5 RAR
    13 Aug

15. **Community Relations**
    **Relief Payment**
    Hoa Long
    1 ATP CA Sec
    8 Aug

**Narrative Description of Projects**

1. The MEDCAP conducted at Hoa Long by Infantry Medics of 3 SAS Sqn treated 59 children. The main complaints were cuts and scratches and stomach upsets. One child had an infected ear and was referred to the doctor at 2 Fd Amb. It is not known if any of those treated were ARVN dependents. The children's reaction to MEDCAP has improved considerably and with the exception of two appeared to enjoy the treatment given.

2. The MEDCAPS at Binh Gia treated 379 villagers of whom 330 were dependents of PF troops in the area. The main complaints were stomach upsets, skin and eye infections.

3. The MEDCAPS at Binh Be treated 190 villagers, it is not known if any of those treated were ARVN dependents. Skin and stomach upsets were the main complaints.

4. The DENTCAP at Binh Ba treated 20 patients and 22 extractions were made.

5. The DENTCAPS at Binh Gia treated a total of 54 patients and 67 extractions were made.
6. The wife of an ARVN/RF Coy member at Binh Gia fell from a bus in Hoa Long while proceeding home from Beria. She was taken to 2 Fd Amb where an examination was conducted and treatment given. She was later transferred to the civilian hospital in Vung Tau.

7. Repairs at one of the Hoa Long schools are progressing to the stage where walls have been patched and some timber framing repaired. 3 Fd Sgr Engineers have inspected the building and have classified the present roofing to be dangerous.

8. A new Flag pole on a raised cement base is being constructed in the school grounds.

9. English classes conducted this week have had an average attendance of 14 students. The Deputy District Chief, a student, himself has requested that an additional one hour instruction be given each week.

10. A box of children's clothing provided from members of the Australian Army Women's Services was distributed to dependents of the RF Coy located at Hoa Long.

11. 4,480 lbs of rice was distributed to the villagers of Binh Ba.

12. A boy, with a gunshot wound in the arm was evacuated by a motor vehicle from Binh Ba to the Vung Tau hospital on 12 Aug. A boy suffering from enemia was transported by helicopter from Binh Gia to the Vung Tau hospital on 13 Aug. A young pregnant woman, the wife of an RF soldier stationed at Binh Gia fell from a bus passing through Hoa Long enroute to Binh Gia. She was treated at 2 Fd Amb then flown by helicopter to Binh Gia to see her husband and then flown to Vung Tau where she was admitted to hospital.

13. Five Hoa Long villagers were employed for a total of 216 hours on the school repair project. They were paid at the rate of 15 piastres per hour. (Total cost $3840 (VN)).

14. Army vehicles were used to ferry about 500 people from Hoa Long to Binh Ba and Binh Gia when the road was opened on 13 Aug. This road had been closed to civilian traffic for several weeks.

15. The sum of 100 piastres was paid to the family of the sick child in Vung Tau hospital. This amount was expended on food and to compensate for the loss of one day's wages.

Evaluation of Programme:
An appreciable difference in the attitude of Hoa Long villagers has been noticed in the past two days. It is considered this may be the result of the road being opened for the one day on 13 Aug 66.

(John J Donohoe)
Major
Staff Officer Civil Affairs
1 ATF
CIVIC ACTION REPORT 4/66

Find attached a copy for information of civic action report 4/66 forwarded to II FFV.

Distribution

List A
List D
Spare 20 (to CA officer)

HQ 1 ATF
Nui Dat
23 Aug 66

(O.D. Jackson)
Brigadier
Commander 1 ATF
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<tr>
<th>No.</th>
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<th>Units Involved</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Date or % Complete</th>
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<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Health and Sanitation</td>
<td>Binh Ba (Y3496740)</td>
<td>5 RAR</td>
<td>14 to 20 August</td>
<td>Continuous</td>
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<td>2.</td>
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<td>3 SAS Sqn/2 Fd Amb</td>
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<td>3.</td>
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<td>Hoa Long (Y3418545)</td>
<td>1 ATF Arty</td>
<td>15 and 17 August</td>
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<td>4.</td>
<td>Health and Sanitation</td>
<td>Binh Gia</td>
<td>33 Dent Unit</td>
<td>15 and 20 August</td>
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<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Health and Sanitation</td>
<td>Binh Gia/Binh Ba</td>
<td>TF Arty/2 Fd Amb</td>
<td>16 and 20 August</td>
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<tr>
<td>6.</td>
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<td>8.</td>
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<td>Binh Gia</td>
<td>HQ 1 ATF LAD (RAFNE)</td>
<td>16 and 17 August</td>
<td>Complete</td>
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<td>9.</td>
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<td>Hoa Long</td>
<td>TF Arty</td>
<td>16, 17, 18 August</td>
<td>85%</td>
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<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Education and Training</td>
<td>Hoa Long</td>
<td>1 ATP CA Sec</td>
<td>4 x 1 hour lessons</td>
<td>Continuous</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
11. Community Relations
   Clothing Distribution
   Binh Gia
   1 ATF CA Sec
   14 August
   Continuous

12. Community Relations
   Toy Distribution
   Binh Gia
   1 ATF CA Sec
   14 August

13. Community Relations
   Food Distribution
   Binh Ba
   5 RAR
   15 August

14. Community Relations
   Relief Payments
   Binh Gia/Hoa Long
   1 ATF CA Sec

15. Community Relations
   Sporting Challenge
   Binh Ba
   5 RAR
   15 August
   Defeated

16. Commerce and Industry
    Jobs for Vietnamese
    Hoa Long
    1 ATF CA Sec
    All week
    Continuous

17. Transportation
    Ferry service
    Hoa Long/Binh Ba
    1 ATF Provost Det
    All week

18. Transportation
    Medical Treatment
    Binh Ba
    5 RAR
    All week

15. Transportation
    MEDIVAC
    Binh Gia/Binh Ba
    RAAF
    Hoa Long

Narrative Description of Projects

1. The MEDIVAC conducted at Binh Ba treated approximately 1200 civilians. As this was the first time many of these people had had the opportunity to consult a doctor, the response for the first few days was enormous. On one day alone 327 people were treated. The main complaints were:

   a. Malnutrition. Considered to be caused by a very unbalanced diet and a complete lack of fresh meat and milk and over half the population suffer from vitamin or iron deficiency.
10. The English classes at Hoa Long had an average attendance of 14 students. The extra one-hour instruction requested commenced this week.

11. Clothing, suitable for young girls which was received from a family in Australia was distributed to the children of deceased members of the RF/FF force at Binh Gia.

12. Some toys were distributed to children of deceased RF/FF members at Binh Gia.

13. Approximately 2,200 kilos of rice was distributed at Binh Ba.

14. Relief payments were made to:
   a. Mother of child admitted to hospital SVN 200
   b. Widow mother of son who was killed SVN 500.

15. On 15 August the children of Binh Ba challenged the Australian Troops to a game of soccer. The challenge was over confidently met by the Australians who were soundly defeated 17 goals to NIL. The Australians were no match for their small opponents.

16. Five Vietnamese villagers from Hoa Long were employed for a total of 240 hours on the school repair project. (total cost SVN 3,600).

17. Approximately 1500 people were transported through the 1 ATR area along Route 2, by army transport.

18. Sixty suspected TB sufferers were transported to Baria hospital for X Ray and then returned to Binh Ba.

19. Royal Australian Air Force Helicopters transported patients from the site of MEDCAPS to the hospital at Vung Tau.

Evaluation of Programme

No change from previous reports.

Comments and Recommendations:

Instruction in diet and in elementary hygiene could most likely lead to improvement in the general health of the children in the villages listed above.
b. Tuberculosis. This is considered to be the main single cause of serious illness and disability. 60 villagers have been X Rayed to this date and of the 20 X Ray reports received 15 are positive for TB.


d. Skin Diseases. Mainly IMPETIGO.

e. Intestinal Worm Infestations.

f. Malaria. Some cases but does not appear to be a major problem.

g. Hystereidal Complaints. Numerous, and possibly brought about by the novelty of having available medical attention.

No dependants of ARVN forces were treated at Binh Ba.

2. The MEDCAPS conducted at Binh Gia treated a total of 480 villagers of whom 336 were ARVN RF dependents. The main complaints were skin diseases, Intestinal worms and Bronchial complaints.

3. The MEDCAPS at Hoa Long were conducted at the school and market area and a total of 310 villagers were treated. The main complaints were skin diseases and bronchial complaints. It is not known how many of those treated were RF dependents but a conservative estimate of 10% (11) could be made.

4. The DENTCAP at Binh Gia treated a total of 30 villagers who requested attention.

5. Specialized medical treatment was given to two adults and one child who were all subsequently transferred to and admitted to the Vung Tau hospital.

6. The school repairs are progressing and new wall length black boards are being installed. The painting of all desks in the school is nearly completed.

7. The grading and packing of the base for the new market at Hoa Long was completed and a contract was negotiated for the building of the new market. This work will be supervised by Australian Army Engineers.

8. The electric generator used in one of the hamlets of Binh Gia was given a top overhaul and general repairs by army mechanics. About 8 hours work was given to this project and, due to the vintage of the equipment it was necessary to fabricate new and replacement parts.

9. The flag pole at the Hoa Long school is nearing completion.
RESTRICTED

If a mobile X Ray plant were available to visit the villages then many people with TB could be detected and means could then be taken to cure and prevent spread of this prevalent disease.

Many schools in this area are suffering from the lack of even the most rudimentary and instructional aids.

(John J Donohoe)
Major
Staff Officer Civil Affairs
JATF

RESTRICTED
CIVIC ACTION REPORT 5/66

Find attached a copy for information of civic action report 5/66 forwarded to II FFV.

Distribution
List A
List D
Spare 20 (to CA Officer)

(OD. Jackson)
Brigadier
Commander 1 ATF
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>AREA/DISTRICT</th>
<th>UNITS INVOLVED</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>DATE OR % COMPLETE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Health and Sanitation</td>
<td>Binh Ba</td>
<td>5 RAR</td>
<td>22 and 24 August</td>
<td>Continuous</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>MEDCAP</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Health and Sanitation</td>
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<td>3 SAS Sqn/2 Fd Amb</td>
<td>23 and 27 August</td>
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<td>MEDCAP</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Health and Sanitation</td>
<td>Hoa Long</td>
<td>1 ATP Arty</td>
<td>22 August</td>
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<tr>
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<td>MEDCAP</td>
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<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Health and Sanitation</td>
<td>Binh Gia</td>
<td>33 Dent Unit</td>
<td>23 and 27 August</td>
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<td>DENTCAP</td>
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<tr>
<td>5.</td>
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<td>Binh Gia</td>
<td>TF Arty</td>
<td>23 and 27 August</td>
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<td>Specialized Medical Aid</td>
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<td>Medical Supplies</td>
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<td>7.</td>
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<td>All week</td>
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<td>School Repairs</td>
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<td>8.</td>
<td>Construction</td>
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<td>1 Fd Sqn RAR/TF GA Sec</td>
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<td>HQ GA Sec</td>
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<td>Flag Pole</td>
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<td>Duration</td>
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<td>Notes</td>
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<td>1 Ptd Sqn RAE</td>
<td>22 August</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Road Repair</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Hoa Long</td>
<td>1 ATP CA Sec</td>
<td>24 August</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Building Materials</td>
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<tr>
<td>14</td>
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<td>1 Ptd Sqn RAE</td>
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<td>Binh Ba</td>
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<td>25 August</td>
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<td>Relief Payments</td>
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<td>All week</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Jobs for Vietnamese</td>
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<td>Hoa Long/Binh Ba</td>
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<td>Binh Gia</td>
<td>AFB Sqn/1 ATP CA Sec</td>
<td>23 August</td>
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<td>Supplies to Binh Gia</td>
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<td>MEDEVAC</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Narrative Description of Projects.

1. The MEDCAPS conducted at Binh Ba treated 140 civilians none of whom were RF/FF dependants. In addition to the MEDCAPS 110 civilians were treated for minor complaints by a medical orderly detached from 1 A T P G A unit.

2. The MEDCAPS conducted at Binh Gia treated a total of 230 civilians of whom about 160 were RF/FF dependants. These two MEDCAPS detected 25 cases of mumps in children. A complete medical survey of this village has not yet been made but initial observations made to date have revealed a prevalence of anaemia most likely caused by hookworm.

3. The MEDCAP conducted at Hon Long was again located at one of the schools and approximately 50 children were treated for minor complaints.

4. The DENTCAPS conducted at Binh Gia treated a total of 23 civilians of whom 14 were RF/FF dependants. 26 teeth were extracted.

5. Three people were given specialized medical treatment and were all evacuated to hospital at Bario. These cases were:-
   a. Fractured Arm
   b. Hand surgery to correct a minor deformity
   c. Hernia

6. Medical supplies were given to one of the hamlets at Binh Gia and will be used to treat minor illnesses etc.

7. School repairs are progressing and work has commenced on renewing existing door frames and the construction of small raised platforms to be used by the teachers. Painting of school fittings continues.

8. The foundations and some of the upright pillars of the Hon Long market have been put in place. Work carried out by a contractor is being supervised by Australian Army Engineers.

9. Labor and cement to be used on the self help project of constructing four classrooms have been obtained and delivered to a hamlet at Binh Gia.

10. Additional work has been undertaken with the construction of the flag pole at the Hon Long school to make it more decorative.
11. English classes at Hoa Long are progressing satisfactorily. Students are requesting English publications to read and to date some have been supplied with an enthusiastic reaction.

12. 400 metres of Route 2 NORTH of Hoa Long was graded and widened.

13. Some building materials, required for the repair of the living quarters for RP dependents were delivered to Hoa Long.

14. A bridge of Route 2, used extensively by civilians going to and from Binh Gia and Binh Ba from Baria and Hoa Long was repaired and improved by Army Engineers.

15. One ton of captured unhusked rice was delivered to the Hoa Long rice mill where an arrangement has been made that in payment for the husking the mill will keep the husks.

16. Small amounts of clothing were distributed to the poorer persons at Binh Gia.

17. 800 lbs of rice was distributed to the poorer people at Binh Ba.

18. Relief payments of $VN 100 each were paid to two of the civilians taken to hospital by 1 ATF CA Section.

19. Six Vietnamese villagers were employed and were paid a total of $VN 4,200.

20. Approximately 2000 people were transported through the 1 ATF area along Route 2, by army transport.

21. 1 ATF CA Sec assisted by 1 APC Sqn transported building supplies to Binh Gia.

22. Three civilians were MEDEVAC from Binh Gia by helicopter. The child HO was transported home after a successful eye operation conducted at 36 MEDEVAC at Vung Tau.

Evaluation of Programme

The population at Binh Gia have shown open appreciation of the Civic Action efforts in this village. They have shown a sincere desire in undertaking a self-help programme and have asked for technical assistance and if possible material assistance.

A small percentage of the population at Binh Ba have indicated that they welcome the Australian presence but the remainder at present are uncommitted.
The population of Hoa Long are more friendly in their outlook towards the troops in the area and the children, with the exception of a few now wave greetings instead of either standing placidly or extending their hands for gifts. Many adults who at first ignored soldiers carrying out civic action projects now appear to be taking a genuine interest in these activities.

Comments and Recommendations

Due to the increase in Civic Action projects Warrant Officers from the CA Section will be detached to three of the major 1 ATP units. A major unit has been given the responsibility for civic action in a particular village. It is anticipated that these Warrant Officers will spend most of their time in these villages where they will direct and co-ordinate the civic action projects.

It has been noticed that there are many children with hare-lips and cleft pallets, particularly in the Vinh Ha hamlet of Binh Chai. It is considered very desirable that a repair programme for these defects be started as soon as possible.

(JOHN J. DONOHUE)
Major
Staff Officer Civil Affairs
1 ATP
Subject: Artillery Resources - Allocation (U)

To: See Distribution

1. The following is the planned allocation of artillery resources in 1 ATF:

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<th></th>
<th>5 RAR</th>
<th>6 RAR</th>
<th>En Succeeding</th>
<th>En Succeeding</th>
<th>GS Bty</th>
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<td>5 RAR</td>
<td>6 RAR</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mid May to Mid Aug 66</td>
<td>105 Bty</td>
<td>161 Bty</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>103 Bty</td>
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<td>in DS</td>
<td>in DS</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mid Aug to Mid Dec 66</td>
<td>103 Bty</td>
<td>161 Bty</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>105 Bty &amp; 101 Bty</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mid Dec 66 to Mid Mar 67</td>
<td>103 Bty</td>
<td>101 Bty</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>161 Bty</td>
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<td>in DS</td>
<td>in DS</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mid Mar to Mid May 67</td>
<td>161 Bty</td>
<td>101 Bty</td>
<td>161 Bty</td>
<td>101 Bty</td>
<td>103 Bty</td>
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<td>in DS</td>
<td>in DS</td>
<td>in DS</td>
<td>in DS</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Notes:

1. The above allocation ensures that no more than two batteries serve in DS of each battalion except that in the case of 5 RAR, 161 Bty comes in DS about 7/8 weeks before the departure of 5 RAR and is then ready to pass on in DS to the successor battalion.

2. The allocation, in general, gives each battery three months general support followed by six months direct support.

3. Proposals from mid March 1967 onward are, at this stage, conjectural only.

2. (U) These dates are subject to alteration.

FOR THE COMMANDER

RICHARD R HANNIGAN
Major

Distribution:

A plus HQ AFV, HQ NZ Force VIETNAM, TDC and Arty Tac HQ (2)
SECRET

AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES

HEADQUARTERS, 1ST AUSTRALIAN TASK FORCE VIETNAM

NUI DAT

R723-1-6 6 Aug 66

SUBJECT: Weekly Operational Forecast (Planned Operations) (U)

TO: II Field Force Vietnam

COPY TO: HQ AFV
HQ NZ Force Vietnam
1 ALSG

1. (U) In compliance with II Field Force Vietnam Tactical SOP (Draft) dated 12 April 1966, the Weekly Operational Forecast (Planned Operations) for the week commencing 8 August 1966 is attached.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

I Encl

REGARDED UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE

RICHARD R. HANNIGAN
Major S3
SECRET

HEADQUARTERS, 1ST AUSTRALIAN TASK FORCE VIETNAM

(WEEKLY OPERATIONAL FORECAST - PLANNED OPERATIONS (R723-1-6))(U)

1. (S) Op HOLSWORTHY:

a. Control hq: 1 ATF
b. Participating Unit: 5 RAR and PHUOC TUY Sector.
c. Type (objective): Cordon, search and beginning of pacification of the village of BINH BA with a view to opening Inter Provincial Route 2.
d. Location: YS448749
f. Support requirements beyond 1 ATF capability:
   (1) Psywar Aircraft.
   (2) Light fire team.
CONFIDENTIAL

AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES

HEADQUARTERS, 1ST AUSTRALIAN TASK FORCE VIETNAM

MUI DAT

R723-1-3

7 Aug 66

SUBJECT: Monthly Evaluation (U)

TO: Commanding General
    II Field Force Vietnam
    ATTN: AG of S, G3
    APO 96266

COPY TO: HQ APV (4)
HQ NZ Force Vietnam (2)
    1 APC Sqn
    1 Fd Regt RAA
    1 Pd Sqn RAB
    5 RAR
    6 RAR
    3 SAS Sqn

(U) In compliance with II Field Force Vietnam Tactical SOP
(Draft), dated 12 April 1966, the Monthly Evaluation (MOM/VAL)
for the month of July 1966 is attached.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

[Note: The name is not legible due to the handwriting]

1 Encl

[Note: The text 'as' is not legible due to the handwriting]

REGARDED UNCLASSIFIED WHEN
SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED
ENCLOSURE

[Signature]

[Note: The name is not legible due to the handwriting]

S3
CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS, 1ST AUSTRALIAN TASK FORCE VIETNAM

(MONEVAL (R723/13))

7 Aug 66

1. (c) GENERAL:

During the month of July 1966 units under operational control of the Commander, 1st Australian Task Force Vietnam conducted search and destroy operations in the area of XA LONG PHUOC YS4464, NUI NGHE YS3972. DUC MY YS447725, NE of LANG PHUOC HOA YS2863 towards the mountain pass YS3166, and to the NE of XA LONG TAN YS4865. Road Runner operations were conducted between the vicinity of LONG BINH YS0606 and NUI DAT YS4366, and between LANG PHUOC HOA YS2863 and NUI DAT YS4366. In addition, extensive patrolling of the TAOR continued. These operations increased the area of VC base denial within the TAOR, demonstrated to the VC our intention and ability to use and keep open roads, interdicted the supply route of D445 BN, and destroyed the local VC Guerilla force in the village of DUC MY YS447725. Operations EMOGGERA, SYDNEY I and II, BRISBANE and HOBART I and II were the major operations for the month.

2. (c) OPERATIONS:

a. A total of six major military operations (battalion size or larger) were conducted against Viet Cong forces in the 1st ATF TAOR by units under operational control of this headquarters. Five of the six operations resulted in contact. There were two small unit (Company size) operations conducted during the month which resulted in negative contact.

b. Operation EMOGGERA, initiated on 21 June, was an operation in which TF 6RAR searched XA LONG PHUOC YS4464 and destroyed all VC installations above and below the ground and denied the village to the VC for later use. The operation terminated on 5 July. Total VC casualties were 1 KIA (possible), 3 WIA (possible) 32 WGS, and ten weapons (all rifles). VC equipment and material loss was 537 houses, approximately 500 escape tunnels and air raid shelters under houses, one tunnel 800 metres long, 20 other tunnels of varying lengths up to 205 feet - the total length being approximately 2,000 feet. 12.5 tons of rice, 3.5 tons of salt, and medical and dental supplies.

c. Operations SYDNEY I and II were conducted during the period 4 to 23 July. TF 5RAR searched and cleared the NUI NGHE YS3972 mountain area, DUC MY Village YS447725, eliminated the local VC guerrilla force in DUC MY village, and brought nearer the opening of Inter Provincial Route 2. Highlight of the operation was the the successful cordon and search of DUC MY village YS447725. The cordon infiltrated during the hours of darkness and a company search group swept into the village at first light (0620 hours).

Simultaneously, a psy ops aircraft overhead warned the villages that the area was surrounded, and to remain in their homes. Total casualties were 4 VC KIA (100), 4 WIA, 4 WGS, and 15 WGS. The need to conduct this operation in two parts, necessitated by Operation BRISBANE, highlights the problem of defending the operational base area and conducting operations with a two battalion task force.

d. Operation BRISBANE, initiated on 16 July, searched the area NE of LANG PHUOC HOA YS2863 towards the mountain pass YS3166. Before the operation, enemy were suspected to be located at YS313 649. There were some indications that the force could have been part of a North Vietnamese battalion, from an area known to have been a VC stronghold of long duration. No significant contact was made, and the operation terminated on 18 July in a Road Runner operation between LANG PHUOC HOA YS2863 and NUI DAT YS4366.

e. Operations HOBART I and II were conducted during the period 24 to 29 July. TF 6RAR executed a search and destroy mission in the area EAST and NE of XA LONG TAN YS4865 where 3 SAS 8pm patrols had reported VC concentrations, and cleared XA LONG TAN YS4865.
CONFIDENTIAL

MONEVAL (R723/1/3), HQ, 1ST AUSTRALIAN TASK FORCE, 7 Aug 66

Operation HOBART I was successful, two major contacts being made with what appeared to be, at the time, a VC Company minus. Total VC casualties were 7 KIA (BO), 4 KIA (possible), 19 WIA. Documents taken from one of the VC KIA established them as members of D445 Battalion. This was the first time that 1st ATF forces had contacted VC other than local guerrilla forces, and also the first time they had received VC mortar fire. D445 was found to be a more skilful enemy than the local guerrilla, capable of quick reaction and manoeuvre. An interesting feature was the use of bugle calls as signals. The search of YA LONG TAN Y34865 in Operation HOBART II did not reveal as much as was expected. Apparently an ARVN operation in the village in March this year was more thorough than anticipated. However some tunnels and caches were located and destroyed.

f. 1,875 air sorties were flown and 8,713 rounds of artillery were fired in support of ground operations during the month.

3. (C) VC ACTIVITY:

Of the contacts made with VC elements during the reporting period the majority were initiated by 1st ATF. However one incident of harassment did occur. No VC Main Force elements were identified in contact although towards the end of the month there were indications of a possible Main Force infiltration into the area West of the 1st ATF TAOR. The local Provincial Mobile Battalion (D445) was contacted and sustained casualties. Enemy losses were 21 KIA (BO) 9 WIA, 5 VOC. Weapons - 10 assorted rifles, one automatic weapon, one M79 grenade launcher, 20 grenades M79, 2 grenades, one claymore mine, one anti-tank mine and 5 rounds of 100mm ammunition. The enemy lost 3 tons 706lbs of rice and 40 gallons of cooking oil. Supplies and equipment were also captured and related installations destroyed. Installations in the main consisted of transitory camps and tunnel systems. S&D operations experienced sniper and in one case mortar fire.

4. (U) RURAL CONSTRUCTION:

During the month of July, the revolutionary development program was supported by units of the 1st ATF as follows:-

a. The surrounds of one school were cleared and graded and the entrance road to the school was widened, graded and levelled.

b. 1000 metres of tracks throughout the village of HOA LONG were widened and levelled and the edges cleared.

c. Conversational English classes were conducted for 20 people (primarily village officials) and plans are being executed to develop this project and to commence another class.

5 (U) PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS/CIVIL AFFAIRS:

a. Pamphlets and voice aircraft were used in Operation SYDNEY II in the BINH DA area. The only raider to 1st ATF came in during this operation.

b. Civic Action

(1) Units of the 1st ATF conducted MEDCAP operations and treated approximately 800 villagers.
CONFIDENTIAL

MCNEAL (R723/1/3), HQ, 1ST AUSTRALIAN TASK FORCE, 7 Aug 66

(2) Over 6000 lbs of captured rice and small quantities of army rations were distributed throughout the TAOR.

(3) Three cases requiring specialised medical treatment were treated by unit medical personnel or cared for and transported to the Provincial hospital at BARIA and the Korean hospital at VUNG TAU.

(4) Further civic action projects are being planned and as the TAOR becomes more established will be put into operation.

6. (U) LOGISTICS: Omitted.

7. (U) PERSONNEL: Omitted.

8. (C) TRAINING:

1 Fd Regt RAA conducted training with OH47 Chinook aircraft. Procedures were standardized for the loading and unloading of the guns, and then practised by crews. The coordination of doctrine and method achieved by this should greatly assist this aspect on future operations. A language course designed to train an additional 30 Vietnamese linguists was initiated at VUNG TAU on 14 July and continued throughout the period. The course is due to terminate on 14 October when the linguists will rejoin their parent units.
CONFIDENTIAL
AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES
HEADQUARTERS, 1ST AUSTRALIAN TASK FORCE VIETNAM
PHU VINH

R723-1-7

SUBJECT: Measurement of Progress (VC Base Area Denial)

TO: II Field Force Vietnam

COPY TO: HQ AFV(4)
HQ NZ Force Vietnam (2)

Attached at Annex is overlay showing the extended area in which VC installations, stores, caches, etc, have been either removed or destroyed as at 10 Aug 1966.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]
RICHARD R. HANIFAN
Major, RA Inf
S3

Annex: A. VC Base Area Denial

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED ENVELOPE
CONFIDENTIAL

Annex A (VC Base Area Denial) to IATF R723-1-7 dated 10 August 1966
WEEKLY OPERATIONAL FORECAST (PLANNED OPERATIONS) FOR WEEK COMMENCING 15 AUGUST 1966.

ONE. OPERATION. HOLSWORTHY.

TWO. CONTROL HQ. 1 ATF

THREE. PARTICIPATING UNITS. ALFA. TASK FORCE 5 RAR CONSISTING OF 5 RAR
CMM 1 APC SQN (MINUS) CMM TWO BTRY S 1 FD REGT RAA CMM ONE TP 1 FD SQN RAE.

BRUNO. PHUOC TUY SECTOR.

FOUR. TYPE (OBJECTIVE). ALFA. CONTINUATION OF PACIFICATION OF XA BINH BA.

BRUNO. SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATION ON SUSPECTED VC PROVINCE HEADQUARTERS IN EAST TAOR CMM INFORMATION FROM VC RALLIER CHIEF OF STAFF 5 DIV.

FIVE. LOCATION. ALFA. YS 448749. BRUNO. CENTRE OF MASS YS 480724.

SIX. PLANNED DATES. OPERATION CONTINUES THROUGH PERIOD UNTIL 19 AUGUST.

SEVEN. HELICOPTER REQUIREMENTS BEYOND ORGANIC CAPABILITY. LIGHT FIRE TEAM.

EIGHT. FIXED WING AIRCRAFT REQUIREMENTS BEYOND ORGANIC CAPABILITY. NONE.

NINE. OTHER COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT REQUIRED BEYOND ORGANIC RESOURCES.

PSYWAR AIRCRAFT.
SECRET
AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES
HEADQUARTERS, 1ST AUSTRALIAN TASK FORCE VIETNAM
NUI DAT

R723-1-9  14 August 1966

SUBJECT: 1st Australian Task Force Vietnam Monthly Operational Forecast September 1966. (U)

TO: Commanding General
    11 Field Force Vietnam
    ATTN: G3 Plans
    APO 96266

COPY TO: HQ AFV
         HQ NZ Force Vietnam
         1 ALSG

(U) In compliance with 11 Field Force Vietnam Regulation Number 335-2 dated 9 June 1966, the Monthly Operational Forecast for September 1966 is attached.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

1 Encl

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE
HEADQUARTERS, 1ST AUSTRALIAN TASK FORCE VIETNAM
(MONTHLY OPERATIONAL FORECAST SEPTEMBER 1966 (R723-1-9))\(U\)

1.  (S) Op VAUCLUSE

   a. Control hq: 1st ATF

   b. Participating Unit: Task Force 6 RAR consisting of 6 RAR, 5 RAR \(-\), one btry 1 Fd Regt RAA, one tp 1 Fd Sqn RAE.

   c. Type (objective): Search and Destroy.

   d. Location: Zones CHERRY and BLUE. See 1 ATF OPLAN 1-66.

   e. Planned dates: 31 August to 14 September 1966.

   f. Support requirements beyond 1 ATF capability: None
OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS - LESSONS LEARNED

Enemy

1. Local guerillas continue to use tracks in spite of our ambushes, indicating poor intelligence.

Weapons

2. A number of cases have been reported of VC being hit by OMC fire and not being stopped. One incident was reported of a VC who was knocked over by an OMC burst who got up again and fled. Over 50 metres the OMC or its ammunition is ineffective, and since many contacts in Vietnam occur in rubber or paddy fields at ranges greater than 50 metres, the OMC is considered unsuitable as a weapon for Vietnam. The OMC should be withdrawn from issue in 1 ATF and replaced by the M16 (Armalite) which is already widely in use by forward scouts and is proving most effective.

3. The M79 (Grenade Launcher) is proving a most effective weapon, particularly for engaging huts. It should be included on the establishment of an infantry battalion on the lines of one per rifle section.

Artillery Support

4. When a contact is made it is useful to call for artillery immediately. This provides an opportunity for ranging, and is of great psychological value to those in the contact.

Search and Destroy Operations

5. Where boundaries between searching sub units cannot be clearly defined on the ground, a buffer space should be left between sub-units to allow freedom of movement with out endangering friendly forces.

Deployment Procedures

6. This must be done by crawling, after contacts at short ranges in close country. Men who stand up to move present themselves as excellent targets to the enemy.

7. This applies particularly to section commanders moving forward to check a situation with forward scouts, or scouts or platoons attempting to move back with information. It may be better to call out than move. Use of covering fire including grenades should not be overlooked.

Fire Discipline

8. Sometimes it is necessary to depart from the normal rules of only firing when the target is seen. On occasions in thick country it is necessary to fire at the general area where it is thought enemy may be.

9. This is a necessary and effective technique providing the section commander always retains control and can stop or re-direct fire.
Cordon and Search

10. For best results cordon should move into position on foot during the hours of darkness. Careful reconnaissance of routes forward by sub unit guide parties is necessary. Search should commence at first light.

11. In close country individuals in a cordon should be no further than 10 metres apart.

12. Reserves should be located at key points outside the cordon.

13. All soldiers should know the Vietnamese words for "Halt/stop", "Hands up", "Come here", "Lie down".

14. Pickets should be placed out to watch for snipers when searching houses or checking ID cards. This applies anywhere, including road check points and pacified villages.

Food Caches

15. These are often found under the floor of houses.

Use of Air

16. Various commanders are still very hesitant in calling for close air support. An attempt to remedy this lack of confidence will be made by arranging for them to fly a mission in a FAC aircraft, and by arranging demonstrations of the use of ground strafing by machine gun fire by fighter aircraft.

COPY TO: II Field Force Vietnam (4)
Responsibilities of 1 Fd Sqn RAE and the principles to be followed in the management of engineer resources allotted 1 ATF for the construction of 1 ATF Base are set out below.

1. 1 Fd Sqn RAE is responsible for:
   a. Advice to commanders and staff on engineer matters.
   b. Technical supervision of all engineer work in 1 ATF Base Area.
   c. Allocation of engineer plant and labour for development of 1 ATF Base within priorities laid down by HQ 1 ATF.
   d. Advice on progress of engineer works.
   e. Allocation and release of engineer stores and material to units and projects in accordance with the priorities and with policies laid down by HQ 1 ATF.
   f. Maintenance of high standards for all types of construction within 1 ATF Base whether done by unit labour, or engineer resources, or both.
   g.checking all P26 for technical efficiency, practicability, safety and economy.
   h. Approval of P26 for those works whose undertaking has been approved in broad principle by HQ 1 ATF according to the priorities of work.
   i. Referring to HQ 1 ATF P26s for work whose undertaking has not been established in principle by HQ 1 ATF.
   j. Maintenance of forward stocks of all engineer materials, based on normal usage rates and for forecasted projects.
   k. Liaison with HQ 1 ALSG (DAQHS Maint) and OC 55 AESG Det to have engineer stores moved forward as required.
   l. Long range forecasting of engineer stores and material required for 1 ATF.
   m. Establishing direct engineer liaison with units to facilitate the foregoing.

2. OC 1 Fd Sqn is to issue on behalf of Cmd 1 ATF such technical instructions and establish such methods of management as are necessary for the discharge of his responsibilities.

3. In the first instance all requests for engineer advice, works, and material is to be referred to 1 Fd Sqn. Requests outside established policies and priorities are to be referred to Cmd 1 ATF or his staff, as appropriate, through OC 1 Fd Sqn.

Distribution: List A, D, 1 ALSG.
CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS, 1ST AUSTRALIAN TASK FORCE VIETNAM
NUI DAT

15 Aug 66

SUBJECT: Crop Destruction (U)

TO: Commanding General
II Field Force Vietnam
ATTN: Cml 0
APO 96266

1. (C) Approval is requested to carry out crop destruction over
a circular area of cultivation of radius 500 metres centred on
Coordinates YS 345768.

2. (C) It is thought that this area is being used for
cultivation by the VC.

3. (C) Written approval has been given by Province Chief, Phuoc
Tuy Province.

FOR THE COMMANDER

R.R. Hannigan
Maj, RA Inf
S3
At TPHC, VIETNAM
HY: AIR FORCE VIETNAM
14214

Nearby area Forward Operating Bases (2 mu
operations) for week ending 18 April
1966 (1) I was assigned participation in
Operation Toledo on 14 April

SECRET

1144
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IMMERGENT PROBLEM</th>
<th>80 05/10</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. ATF</td>
<td>N. I. KORCEV</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We must force Việt Nam Hr. B. Force Việt Nam 1 144.


1. ATFP is requested to attack, support, or otherwise engage.
WEEKLY OPERATIONAL FORECAST (PLANNED OPERATIONS) FOR WEEK COMMENCING 29 AUGUST 1966. ONE. OPERATION VAUCLUSE CMM SCHEDULED FOR PERIOD 31 AUGUST THRU 14 SEPTEMBER 1966 CMM IS DEFERRED AND WILL NOT COMMENCE BEFORE 14 SEPTEMBER 1966. HQ 1 ATF R723-1-9 DATED 14 AUGUST 1966 REFERS.

TWO. SATURATION PATROLLING OF TAOR WILL CONTINUE DURING PERIOD 29 AUGUST THRU 14 SEPTEMBER 1966.

THREE. 1 ATF PARTICIPATION IN OPERATION TOLEDO CONTINUES.

Drafters Name: Hutchison
Office: G Plans
Tele No: 3

Releasing Officers Signature and Rank: [Signature] Capt
AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES

HEADQUARTERS, 1ST AUSTRALIAN TASK FORCE VIETNAM

NUX DAT

1890/1/2

28 August 1966

SUBJECT: Armored/Armoured CH-47A Evaluation

TO: Commanding General
    11 Field Force Vietnam
    APO 96266


2. The 1st ATP was given priority on the use of the A/A CH-47 assets from 31 July thru 4 August. The unit was also used extensively on "as available" basis from 26 July thru 30 July. The A/A CH-47s were used primarily as escorts for UH-1B aircraft which were inserting or extracting patrols. They were also used for reconnaissance by fire missions and for strikes on known enemy locations.

3. The aircraft were committed on task force level and no problems were encountered with Command and Control. The aircrews were given detailed briefings prior to each mission and all operations were completed as planned.

4. The following lesson was learned during the employment of the A/A CH-47s:

   (a) When the aircraft made firing passes directly over the supported units, the 40 millimetre, 20 millimeter and .50 caliber breeches and associated linkages fell into the supported unit area. Twice this resulted in frantic reports that the helicopters were firing into friendly troops. Supported units must be made aware of the types of items which may impact in their areas during firing passes.

5. The A/A CH-47s are capable of accurately delivering a formidable amount of firepower. It would be extremely desirable to have two of this type aircraft available for future support missions. Under the current operational situation the aircraft would be used approximately one and one-half hours per day.

FOR THE COMMANDER

[Signature]

RICHARD R. HAMITON
Major, RA Inf
83

Headquarters
1st Australian Task Force,
Aust Forces Vietnam,
Aust FPO 3,
o/- GPO Sydney

29th August 1966

The Hon. I. Mc. Sinclair B.A., L.L.D.,
Minister for Social Services,
Canberra,
A.C.T.

Thank you for your very thoughtful and generous letter of the fifth of August.

It was an honour and a pleasure to have you with us and I’m very glad you enjoyed your visit.

With best wishes,
R723-1-3

5-SEP 66

SUBJECT: Monthly Evaluation (U)

TO: Commanding General
II Field Force Vietnam
ATTN: AG OF S, 63
APO 96266

(U) In compliance with II Field Force Vietnam Regulation Number 335-3, dated 6 June 1966, the Monthly Evaluation (MONEVAL) for the month of August 1966 is attached.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Encl

RICHARD R. HANNIGAN
Major, RA Inf

DISTRIBUTION:

1 - 1 APC Sqn
1 - 1 Fd Regt RAA
1 - 1 Fd Sqn RAE
1 - 5 RAR
1 - 6 RAR
1 - 3 SAS Sqn
4 - HQ AFV
2 - HQ NZ Force Vietnam

REGRaded UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE
CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS, 1ST AUSTRALIAN TASK FORCE VIETNAM
(MONEVAL (R/25/1/5))

1. (C) GENERAL:

During the month of August 1966 units under operational control of the Commander, 1st Australian Task Force Vietnam conducted a cordon and search of DUC TRUNG YS453745 and XA BINH BA YS448749, and search and destroy operations in the vicinity of XA BINH BA YS448749, NUI DAT YS435675, XA LONG TAN YS42885, and vicinity of YS4370. A ROAD RUNNER Operation was conducted between NUI DAT YS4365 and LONG HAI YS4449. In addition extensive patrolling of the TAOR continued. These operations increased the area of VC base denial within the TAOR, demonstrated to the VC our determination and ability to use and keep open roads, removed the communist infrastructure in XA BINH BA and pacified the village, opened Inter Provincial Route 2 (LT2) to civilian traffic, (the first free use of the road in three years) from HOA LONG YS427657 to area NORTH of XA BINH BA at YS467757, and inflicted heavy casualties on an estimated two battalions of 275 Regt and elements of D445 Regional Bn. Operations ROAD RUNNER SOUTH, HOLSWORTHY, SMITHFIELD, and TOLEDO were the major operations for the month.

2. (C) OPERATIONS:

a. A total of four major military operations (battalion size or larger) were conducted against Viet Cong forces in the 1st ATF TAOR by units under operational control of this headquarters. Two of these operations resulted in contact. There were three small unit (company size) operations conducted during the month with negative contact.

b. Operation ROAD RUNNER SOUTH was conducted by 5 RAR between NUI DAT YS4365 and LONG HAI YS4449 on 1 August with negative contact.

c. Operation HOLSWORTHY, Initiated on 3 August, was an operation in which TF 5 RAR simultaneously cordoned and searched DUC TRUNG YS453745 and XA BINH BA YS448749. 168 males of military age were evacuated to BANH YS3760 for interrogation, of whom 47 were found to be confirmed VC belonging to both the military and party framework in XA BINH BA. It is considered that the communist infrastructure in XA BINH BA has been rendered ineffective, if not completely destroyed. The pacification of XA BINH BA was carried out by TF 5 RAR in conjunction with PHUOC TUY Sector; one company of 5 RAR remained in the village to provide static security from 18 August through the reporting period. Activities including a teacher program, soccer matches, and soldiers attending church with the villagers, have assisted in improving co-operation with the villagers. Inter Provincial Route 2 (LT2) was opened to civilian traffic for the first time without tax in three years from HOA LONG YS427657 to area NORTH of XA BINH BA at YS467757 on 13 and 14 August. Since 18 August the road has been open on a permanent basis and has had a marked effect on village econmy enabling the people to return to a more normal way of life. The operation terminated on 18 August.

d. Operation SMITHFIELD, Initiated on 18 August, was an operation in which 6 RAR executed a search and destroy mission in the area of NUI DAT YS435675 and XA LONG TAN YS42885. D/6 RAR and 3 APC Tp, supported by Task Force Artillery and air support, inflicted heavy casualties on an estimated two battalions of 275 Regt and elements of D445 Regional Bn. Total casualties were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Friendly</th>
<th>Enemy</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17 KIA</td>
<td>245 KIA (BC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 WIA</td>
<td>3 VCC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 VC WIA (possible)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 x 60mm mortar complete</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8 x 7.62mm LMG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5 x 7.62mm rifles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>729 x AK Rifles</td>
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</tbody>
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CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

MONEVAL (R725/1/3), HQ, 1ST AUSTRALIAN TASK FORCE, 3 SEP 66.

29 x AK rifles
1 x M1 rifle
1 x M1 carbine
1 x 7.62mm Bapu gun
1 x 7.62mm wheeled MG
5 x A/tk weapons
1 x 30 cal BAR
1 x Thompson SMG
28 x 60mm bobs
22 rounds 75mm A/tk
330 assorted grenades
150 assorted weapon magazines
15,000 rounds SA assorted
2 x 75mm RCL's
28 x A/tk grenades
8 x K50 magazines, all full
3 x LAW projectiles
1 x US fragmentation grenade
1 x VC local pattern grenade
226 x rounds 7.62mm short
4 x sets webbing

The operation terminated on 21 August.

a. Operation TOLEDO. A search and destroy operation by TF 5 RAR in
the vicinity of YS5170 as part of Operation TOLEDO was initiated on 26 August.
The operation terminated on 31 August with negative contact.

f. 3,019 air sorties were flown and 2,657 rounds of artillery were
fired in support of ground operations during the month.

3. (C) VC ACTIVITY

a. Contacts with the enemy during the period followed the normal pattern
of brief contacts with local force guerrillas except for the following incidents:

(1) [170245H]. The Task Force Base Area received approximately 62 x
91mm mortar rounds and 5 x 70mm Howitzer rounds. Base plate positions were
to the EAST and SE and fire was believed to have come from elements of 275
VC Regt.

[2] [181600H]. D/6 RAR were involved in a three hour fire-fight with
an estimated two battalions of 275 Regt and elements of D445 BN. The en-
counter resulted in 245 KIA (BC) and 3 VCC. Statements by two of the VCC
indicated that one battalion of 275 Regt is NVA and the remainder of the
Regiment has been heavily infiltrated with NVA replacements. The third VCC
identified D445 BN as having been in contact as well.

3. Towards the end of the month agent reports and aerial reconn-
aisance have indicated considerable VC activity and movement in the area
around Nui Thai Vai (YS2871). There has also been evidence of recent use
of tracks running NORTH from this location to the HAT DICH area (YS3280)

4. (U) RURAL CONSTRUCTION:

During the month of August, the revolutionary development program was
supported by units of 1st ATF as follows:

a. Construction Projects:

(1) A contract has been made for the construction of a Market at
Hoa Long (YS498850). To date the market is 30% complete and construction is
progressing satisfactorily.

(2) A new flag pole on a raised cement stand was constructed at
Hoa Long school (YS498863).
b. Repair Projects:

(1) The following repair projects were undertaken:
   (a) Generator repair. An old electric generator, used in one
       of the hamlets of Binh Gia (YS502775) was repaired and is now functioning
       satisfactorily.
   (b) School repairs. Extensive repairs to a school at Hoa
       Long (YS418645) are in progress. This school was closed by the VC for some
       time, and the VC in their efforts to keep it closed, fired on it causing
       damage to walls, floors and ceiling. To date, the floors and walls have been
       repaired, wall length blackboards fitted. Current repairs being carried out
       are painting of desks, refitting of doors and door frames and the construction
       of stands for the teachers. The roofing is considered to be unsafe and plans
       are being made to have it completely replaced.
   (c) A bridge on inter ProvXinal Route 2 (LT2) was repaired
       and improved.
   (d) Approximately 400 metres of road was widened and levelled.

c. Building Materials Distribution: 50 bags of cement and approximately
   10 sq metres of slab was given to a hamlet at Binh Gia (YS502775) where the
   local civilians will, by self help and Army supervision, construct a new
   four room school. Further materials will be issued when required.

5. (U) PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS/CIVIL AFFAIRS:

a. Psychological Operations:

   (1) Payops support for the Task Force was provided by 245 Payops Bn
       based at BIEN HOA.

   (2) 22 Aug:
       (a) 200 newsheets explaining the economic aid given to
           South Vietnam by 30 Free World Countries, were handed out at the Task Force
           check point at YS430667.
       (b) 75,000 Malaria Leaflets were dropped in an area of 10
           square kilometres NORTH of Binh Gia (YS4977).
       (c) 40,000 Anti-Viet Cong Draft Leaflets were dropped over
           Hoa Long (YS4264) DUC MY (YS4273) and Binh BA (YS4524).
       (d) A C47 loudspeaker aircraft broadcast a chieu-hoi tape
           for 30 minutes over the area NE from the Task Force base and dropped 100,000
           leaflets directed at North Vietnamese troops.

   (3) 25 Aug:
       (a) 50,000 Malaria leaflets, 50,000 Chieu-hoi leaflets and
           50,000 leaflets concernig ARVN and VC life were dropped along the valley from
           YS340700 to YS300650.
       (b) In addition, 200 health posters and 1,000 newsheets were
           handed to Sub-Sector HQ for distribution in Hoa Long.

   (4) 26 Aug:
       (a) In the area bounded by YS340720, YS340800, YS350800, YS350720 a
           total of 125,000 leaflets containing Malaria themes and Instructions for
           potential ralliers were dropped.
       (b) Information from two ralliers revealed that they were
           encouraged to rally by their families in Hoa Long. Where possible payops
           has been directed at the VC through their families.

   (5) 28 Aug: There were 75,000 Malaria and Chieu-hoi and 25,000 VC
Tax leaflets dropped over an area bounded by YS280710, YS280730, YS280710 and YS300730. An agent report had stated there was a VC battalion in the area.

(6) There is a requirement for the Task Force to have its own voice aircraft to quickly and fully exploit every chance to make the VC surrender. An ideal line would have been during the night after the battle with 275 Regt on 18 Aug 66.

So far there have been no safe-conduct passes dropped in the TACR. A supply of these would also assist in convincing a VC that he should rally.

b. Civic Action:

(1) There were 2,036 Vietnamese treated during MEDCAP activities. The main complaints treated were skin diseases, bronchial complaints, intestinal worms, tuberculosis, anemia (particularly in children), and malaria. Sixty persons were transported to BARRA hospital for chest X-ray. Of these twenty persons were positive TB cases.

(2) A total of 132 Vietnamese were given dental treatment and 155 extractions were made.

(3) Small quantities of children's clothing, sent from relatives of Australian soldiers, was distributed to needy families.

(4) A small quantity of toys, received from the family of an Australian officer, was distributed to the children of widows.

(5) 460 school kits received from C.A.R.E. were distributed to children at the Hon Long school (YS418645). Prior to receiving these kits it was common for up to two children to share a pencil and one piece of paper.

(6) A small quantity of simple medical items were issued to a priest at Binh Gia.

(7) A total of SVN 3,550 was paid to:

(a) Vietnamese admitted to hospital for the purchase of food.
(b) Parents of children who accompany children to hospital.
(c) Payment to widow with large family.

(8) English classes are being conducted at HOA LONG YS4264 and are progressing very satisfactorily. English/Vietnamese dictionaries were purchased and issued to each student.

(9) Vietnamese carpenters, masons, and labourers are being employed to carry out some repair projects. SVN 14,630 was paid in wages during August.

(10) Nine Vietnamese were given specialized medical treatment and all were admitted to hospitals at YUNG TAU and BARRA.

(11) Transportation of Vietnamese by Australian Army and RAAF transport was carried out as follows:

(a) Approximately 4,000 civilians were transported by vehicles along Inter Provincial Route 2 (L12) through 1st ATF Base Area.

(b) Sixty civilians were transported by vehicles from KA BINH BA to BARRA for X-ray as suspected TB sufferers and were subsequently returned to KA BINH BA.

(c) Nine civilians were evacuated by RAAF helicopter from MEDCAP locations to hospitals at YUNG TAV and BARRA. Seven of these returned to their homes by helicopter on discharge from hospital.

(12) A total of SVN 333,747 was expended on Civic Action Projects for August. SVN 300,000 of this was the first two payments on the market construction contract.
6. (U) LOGISTICS: Omitted.

7. (U) PERSONNEL: Omitted.

8. (C) TRAINING: A language course designed to train an additional thirty Vietnamese linguists continued throughout the period. The course is due to terminate on 24 September when the linguists will rejoin their parent units.